THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly, and lost among the host—as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—The Voice of the Silence

VOL. XX SEPTEMBER 1949 No. 9

"THUS HAVE I HEARD"—

No man is born into the world whose work
Is not born with him. There is always work,
And tools to work withal, for those who will.

These lines of Lowell's came to our mind as we were reading the sage advice given by Rajaji, India's Governor-General. He was speaking to the Pressmen of Bombay on the 10th of August. In answer to the remarks about the grave vicissitudes of the middle class he is reported to have said that if the people of that class "gave up caste feeling and readily jumped over to the occupations of the working-class, they could better their prospects." The chief reason why this is not done is the lack of real appreciation of the dignity of all labour.

> Who sweeps a room as for Thy laws
> Makes that and th' action fine.

This concept, which all sages have taught, including the National Hero, Gandhiji, is not understood by the sons and daughters of India who speak of him as the Father of the Nation. What more striking precept could he have given, backed by his own great example, than the teaching about doing the scavenger's work? The Governor-General said that

any disinclination to work was the worst form of caste feeling. In his experience, he found there was an element of obstinate attachment to caste, creating class feelings among the middle-class people. They must be prepared to accept any occupation.

Our work is born with us. How many of us are missing our calling? Our instruments of sense, be they bodily or mental, are also born with us; they are within us. How many of us are neglecting our tools endeavouring to make use of somebody else's? The last condition in our opening quotation, however, is the most important—"for those who *will*." When we depend on outer and extraneous influences we run the risk of neglecting the use and employment of our own resources,

which are intrinsic and within us. The curse of the stupid doctrine of vicarious atonement affects the race on the plane of business and economics; graft, personal "pull," family and hereditary influence are some of its manifestations. If as a religious belief this tenet kills the soul through debasement, in the sphere of business and on the plane of action it impoverishes the Will, kills initiative, begets cowardice, and makes man a slave of others. The *will* to work enables a man unerringly to come upon his vocation—the work with which, and to do which, he is born.

And why do so many not find their own job and their own place? Because of false standards. What is right and proper to do, what are the honourable and non-honourable ways of earning livelihood, are not judged in the light of one's own aptitude and character, but in the garish light of worldly opinions. It is not recognised that work as work is holy—cleaning the street, cooking the dinner as ennobling as painting a picture or creating a poem. Nay, still worse; mental corruption has gone so deep in modern society that it will not acknowledge that cleaning the street is more ennobling to the soul and more serviceable to the race than selling commodities that dirty the very mind of the race, like some books and periodicals, like some foods and drinks. How many fair readers will accept the fact—for that is what it is—that cooking a dinner is a more noble, more important, more spiritual vocation than "thumping" a typewriter? Each profession will find its own divinity, even the typewriting, and the bookkeeping, when it will accept *all* work as sacred, all professions as holy.

There is a very telling tale, which George Eliot has versified, of Stradivarius, the maker of violins. He says:—

> My work is mine,
> And, heresy or not, if my hand slacked
> I should rob God—since He is fullest good—
> Leaving a blank instead of violins.
> I say, not God Himself can make man's best
> Without best men to help Him. I am one best
> Here in Cremona, using sunlight well
> To fashion finest maple till it serves
> More cunningly than throats for harmony.
> 'Tis rare delight: I would not change my skill
> To be the Emperor with bungling hands
> And lose my work, which comes as natural
> As self at waking.

"God could not make Antonio Stradivari's violins without Antonio."

The purpose of the Inner Divinity in man is not only to draw him out of his carnal nature but also to aid him so to transmute it that it shall radiate the Efficiency and the Beauty of the World of Spirit, with which that Inner Divinity shines.

SHRAVAKA

PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHERS

[We publish here the first part of the striking address on " The Climate of Indian Thought " with which **Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, M.A., Ph.D.,** Head of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Madras, inaugurated at Cornell University last autumn the course of lectures on Indian Philosophy for which he was invited to the U.S.A. The second and concluding instalment will be published next month under the title " The Path of Soul Evolution."—ED.]

There was a time when the intellectual West thought that there could have been nothing like genuine philosophical thinking in India. Happily, that prejudice is fast disappearing. Discerning men in the West are beginning to see that the evolution of ideas in India during the long centuries of her remarkable history does constitute an important chapter in the career of world-thought. Just as the physical atmosphere is essential for the sustenance of an individual's body, so is an intellectual *milieu* necessary for his mind to thrive in. It is a truism that every man is a philosopher, whether he knows it or not. What is true of the individual is true of every nation or race. A country with such hoary traditions as India's cannot be without its lessons for the student of international thought. Deussen attributes the tendency on the part of the Westerner to escape the study of Indian philosophy to what he calls " European idleness, " and adds :—

The philosophy of the Indians must become for everyone who takes any interest in the investigation of philosophical truth, an object of the highest interest ; for Indian philosophy is and will be the only possible parallel to what so far the Europeans have considered as philosophy.[1]

Like Deussen, every Orientalist who has had any acquaintance with Indian philosophy holds it in high esteem. Max Müller, one of the pioneers in Oriental research, puts his conviction in these striking words :—

If I were to ask myself from what literature, we here in Europe, we who have been nurtured almost exclusively on the thoughts of Greeks and Romans, and of one Semitic race, the Jewish, may draw that corrective which is most wanted, in order to make our inner life more perfect, more comprehensive, more universal, in fact more truly human, a life, not for this life only, but a transfigured and eternal life—again, I should point to India.

And in the same book, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* (p. xvii) Max Müller wrote :—

And if hitherto no one would have called himself a philosopher who had not read and studied the works of Plato and Aristotle, of Descartes and Spinoza, of Locke, Hume, and Kant in the original, I hope that the time will come when no one will claim that name who

[1] *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 3.

is not acquainted at least with the two prominent systems of ancient Indian philosophy, the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya.

One notices in the West the use of such terms as "Hindu philosophy" and "Brāhmanism" as synonyms for Indian philosophy. The usage, however, is not accurate. It is true that the Hindus, constituting as they do the majority of India's population, have contributed most to Indian thought. India's philosophy is mostly Hindu philosophy, but not wholly. Besides Hinduism, which is the oldest living religion, India has produced Buddhism which has become a world religion and Jainism which has remained an indigenous faith; and each of these has a philosophical basis. So the scope of Indian philosophy covers, besides the Hindu systems of thought, non-Hindu and even anti-Hindu philosophical schools. The school of the Cārvākas, for instance, which is the Indian counterpart of materialism, ridiculed the tenets of the Hindu faith—and, in fact, of all faith—denied the existence of soul and God, and adopted pleasure as the aim of life. The expression "Brāhmanism," signifying "the philosophy of Brahman," is applicable only to those systems of Hindu thought which are directly based on the Vedānta, by which term we mean the Upaniṣads, the concluding portions of the Veda. Though Vedānta is rightly regarded by many as the crown of Indian thought, it is not the whole of Indian philosophy.

From the snowy peaks of the Himalayas to the burning sands of the desert plains, one can find in India every possible type of climate. Such is the case with her intellectual and spiritual climate also. From the unbelieving sceptic and the dogmatic materialist to the devout theist and the uncompromising absolutist, every thinker has found a home in this hospitable country. In the same region, and side by side, contrasted systems of thought have flourished. This fact is overlooked by those scholars who overrate the influence of geography on the mind of man. It is no doubt true that the outer surroundings affect the inner aspirations and attitudes of men, but it is unjustifiable to derive every characteristic of a country's philosophy from its physical features and its geographical contours. The greatness of a philosopher lies not a little in his ability to rise above parochialisms, both temporal and spatial, to become a spectator of all time and existence. So it is nothing uncommon that one should find in India from the earliest times all shades of philosophic thought, from pluralism to monism, from atheism to theism, and from materialism to idealism.

It is significant that each of the systems of Indian thought is called a *darśana*, which means a point of view. In the *Brahmajāla-sutta* mention is made of no less than sixty-two schools of philosophy, which are distinguished from the view which the Buddha taught. In the *Mahā-*

bhārata we have descriptions of various philosophical sects which were then flourishing in India.[1] In Bāṇa's *Harṣa-carita* we come across a large forest where the followers of different philosophical schools including the *Lokāyata* (Materialism) met and discussed in perfect peace and harmony. In later centuries several manuals were written, each giving a critical estimate of leading philosophical schools from the author's own point of view. The best known among them is the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* of Mādhavācārya which expounds and examines sixteen systems of thought from the stand-point of Advaita-vedanta. The *Ṣad-darśana-samuccaya* of Haribhadra is a similar work from the stand-point of Jaina philosophy. Not only was there difference between one school and another; but also within each school itself there arose doctrinal differences. Thus we meet in India with a vast variety of views. As the *Mahābhārata* puts it, "There is no reflective thinker (*muni*) who has not an opinion of his own."

It has been customary to divide the schools of Indian philosophy into two groups, orthodox and heterodox. The Sanskrit equivalents of these terms are *āstika* and *nāstika*, and they literally mean "those systems which say *is*" and "those which say *is-not*." The two groups are thus respectively *yes*-schools and *no*-schools. Affirmation and denial in this context mean acceptance and rejection, respectively, of the authority of the Veda. Those schools which owe allegiance to the Veda are called orthodox (*āstika*); and those which do not recognise the authoritativeness of the Veda are termed heterodox (*nāstika*). (The other meanings of the term "*āstika*" are (1) belief in God, and (2) belief in after-life; and correspondingly "*nāstika*" would mean (1) no belief in God, and (2) no belief in after-life. Not all nāstika systems reject God or Godhead; and the nāstika schools with the exception of the Cārvāka believe in after-life. Among the āstika systems, some do not recognise the need to believe in God, though all of them admit after-life.)

There are chiefly six systems of orthodox philosophy. They are: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmānsā and Vedānta. The heterodox schools are: Cārvāka, Buddhism and Jainism. Mostly the heterodox schools rose in reaction to some of the tenets of the orthodox systems. Buddhism and Jainism, to start with, were reformist movements. And so, the tendency of these schools at first was to be critical and negative. But soon they had to turn to the side of construction in order to maintain themselves as against rival systems. And, on the whole, it must be said that the orthodox schools gained a good deal from the criticisms of the heterodox systems. In good time, for instance, the Buddha was received into the Hindu pantheon and was included among the incarnations of God. Even the

[1] See *Anugita*, ch. xxiv.

Cārvāka served its own purpose by drawing men's minds away from excessive ritualism, and by developing in them an attitude of criticism.

One marked feature of the early Indian thinkers, whether of the orthodox or the heterodox tradition, is that we know very little about them. As Max Müller remarks :—

While in most countries a history of philosophy is inseparable from a history of philosophers, in India we have indeed ample materials for watching the origin and growth of philosophical ideas, but hardly any for studying the lives or characters of those who founded or supported the philosophical systems of that country. Their work has remained and continues to live to the present day, but of the philosophers themselves hardly anything remains to us beyond their names. (*Op. cit.*, p. 1).

Even their dates cannot be settled with any measure of certainty. They let their works speak without the intrusion of their personal biographies. Many a work on Indian philosophy has come down to us as anonymous. Several treatises, again, have been passed on to us under pseudonyms. It must be very irksome to the historian of Indian philosophy not to be able to date his authors, and to the student who must go without interesting and spicy anecdotes from the lives of the philosophers whose thoughts he has to study. But the disinclination on the part of the Indian philosopher to give details of his own biography has a deeper meaning, and reveals one of the peculiar traits of Indian character. It is no doubt true, as Max Müller says, that no philosopher owes everything to himself.

He grows from a soil that is ready made for him, and he breathes an intellectual atmosphere which is not of his own making. The Hindus seem to have felt this indebtedness of the individuals to those before and around them far more strongly than the Greeks, who, if they cannot find a human author, have recourse even to mythological and divine personages in order to have a pedestal, a name, and an authority for every great thought and every great invention of antiquity. The Hindus are satisfied with giving us the thoughts, and leave us to find out their antecedents as best we can. (*Ibid.*, pp. 2-3).

But there is much more than this in what may be called the impersonality of Indian philosophy. The philosopher in India seems to think that the truths which he or his fellow-seekers discover are eternal. No one has any monopoly rights over the truths of philosophy. The truth does undoubtedly influence his life ; his life has no influence over the truth. And so he prefers to keep himself in the background and push forward the view of reality he has discovered.

Another characteristic of Indian philosophy is that the systems are not developed one after the other, but grow alongside one another. It is usual to divide the course of Indian philosophy into three periods : the Vedic Period (1500 B.C.—600 B.C.), the Epic Period (600 B.C.—200 A.D.), and the Classical Period (from 200 A.D.). Attempts have

been made to date the several trends or systems of thought on the basis of the degree of complexity in each. Applying the principle of evolution, it is maintained, for instance, that in the *Rgveda* there is a gradual development from naturalism and polytheism to monotheism and monism. There are, however, two considerations which should make us suspicious of an unrestricted philosophical use of the principle of evolution. First, in grading the different philosophical trends and schools, the point of view held by the one who grades them plays a decisive part. The monotheist, *e.g.*, would put monism lower than his own view, while the monist would regard monotheism as the lower conception. Secondly, *what is more evolved in thought need not necessarily be later in time.* It is quite conceivable that a system of philosophy which is considered to be more satisfactory than another came to be formulated earlier. We cannot argue that a system should have been posterior to another because it is more evolved and more acceptable than the other. Surely, we cannot maintain that Śaṅkara's philosophy was posterior to that of Madhva, because non-dualism appeals to us more than dualism. Thus, it is extremely difficult, in the absence of other conclusive evidence, to date the systems on the basis of the degree of satisfyingness. Especially when we come to the Classical Period, it is futile to ask which system came first. The systems would seem to have grown together through mutual criticism; they did not appear one after the other. It is only in certain cases, as in that of Buddhism, and in regard to comparatively late teachers like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva, that we can be fairly certain as to the dates of their respective teaching.

The method employed by most exponents of philosophy in India is the dialectical method used with great skill and rare insight even by such early thinkers as Yāgñavalkya in the Upaniṣads. In the Classical Age a technique was developed whereby the exponent of a system could unfold his thesis by a progressive criticism of the rival schools. The author of a treatise usually begins with an attack on the system which is remotest from his own, examines it in the light of another which is less unacceptable, then criticises that other system from the stand-point of a school which is still less unacceptable; and this process goes on till it is demonstrated that the author's own system is the best, since it is free from defects. Thus we have three stages in the argument: (1) The statement of the *prima facie* views (*pūrvapakṣa*), (2) The criticism of those views (*khaṇḍana*), and (3) The establishment of the final position (*siddhānta*). Since any important treatise on any of the schools deals with the tenets of the other schools also, it becomes a compendium of the entire range of Indian philosophy, though from its own particular point of view.

Though there has been a variety

of philosophical and religious views in India, attempts have not been lacking to bring about a harmony among them. In fact, harmonisation of apparently conflicting ideas and ideologies is one of the characteristic notes of Indian culture. The specific manner in which it was sought to order the divergent philosophical views into one coherent whole was by postulating that each is good for a set of people. This is known as the doctrine of eligibility (*adhikāra*). Each person is in a certain stage of development. That system of thought is good for him which not only appeals to his mind but also contains the seeds of his further growth. In this way, there is a procession of philosophical views and each individual has to go through these until he attains to the final truth. This does not, however, imply an ultimate relativism in knowledge; it only means that one should not rest on his oars, having attained but a partial glimpse of Reality. It also means that no one should be so dogmatic as to think his view of reality the only one to take, and that every other individual must needs adopt his point of view.

In spite of doctrinal differences, the schools of Indian thought share in common certain fundamental characteristics. This is because all of them participate in a common culture. Behind the variety of the systems there is, as Max Müller observes, "a large *Mānasa* Lake of philosophical thought and language, far away in the distant North, and in the distant Past, from which each thinker was allowed to draw for his own purposes."[1] Every civilisation or culture has its own distinguishing quality. The Greeks spoke of it as the "nature" of a people. The Indian name for it is "*dharma.*" One civilisation may specialise in politics, another in art, a third in commerce, and so on. That which India has always regarded as her soul is spirituality. The only exception to this among the schools is the Cārvāka materialism. But this point of view was hardly ever a popular one. We do not possess any extant treatise on the Cārvāka. All that we know about it is from the criticisms found in the works on other systems. The Cārvāka comes in for all-round ridicule. It is quite possible that a Sūtra on the Cārvāka-darśana existed at one time. But the fact that no trace of it or of any other text is to be had now shows that the view that it advocated did not find favour with any appreciable number of men. It is hardly fair to call it a darśana or system of philosophy. At best, the Cārvāka in India was a passing mood of the mind of man (*sāmyaika-darśana*), to be got over and surpassed quite early in the life of thought.

An abiding faith in the self or spirit is, then, the dominant note of Indian philosophy. The Upaniṣadic expression which has been popular with the Indian thinker as a synonym for philosophy is *Ātma-vidyā*

[1] *Ibid.*, p. xviii.

or the science of self. The text which says "There is nothing higher than the self; that is the final limit; that is the supreme goal" represents the central theme of Indian philosophy. Even the realistic systems like the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika assign to the self or spirit a primary place. In the Sāṅkhya, *e.g.*, the analysis of Matter (*Prakṛti*) and the study of its evolution subserve the purpose of enabling one to discriminate between matter and spirit, and thus to release the latter from bondage to the former. The Indian philosopher looks within before looking without. Philosophy, then, is not the residuum of the objective sciences or an examination of their common assumptions, but a quest for the inner reality of things. It is in this sense that Kauṭilya says in his *Artha-śāstra*, "Philosophy is the lamp of sciences, the means of performing all the works, and the support of all the duties." And in the *Bhagavad-gītā* (x. 32), the Lord identifies himself with, among sciences, the science of the self.

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

INDIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Shri M. Ramaswamy, a well-known writer on Constitutional Law, brought out some valuable points in his analysis at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on July 28th, of the position of India *vis-à-vis* the Commonwealth of Nations. Under the agreement reached at the London Conference in April last, while India as a sovereign independent republic will have complete freedom of action, she will retain her full membership of the Commonwealth of Nations, accepting "the King as the symbol of the free association of the independent member Nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth." This Shri Ramaswamy hailed as a statesmanlike decision.

Free India owes more to Britain than the magnanimous gift of independence, which at a stroke balanced a host of grievances. Shri Ramaswamy considers as England's greatest benefaction to India the concepts of the rule of law and of the importance of the liberty of the individual, which had permeated Indian life and institutions and influenced the new Constitution. Good-will and friendliness between the two countries, he declared, had never been greater than at present, and the statement in the Balfour Declaration of 1926 that "free institutions formed the life-blood of the Commonwealth and free co-operation was its instrument" meant more today than when it had been made.

The friendly solution of the problem of Commonwealth relations is, as Shri Ramaswamy said, a happy augury, but any grouping of nations, however necessary in the present world context, must be regarded as a half-way house on the way to a Commonwealth of all mankind.

NEWTON'S MYSTICISM

[We do not believe that the "psychological riddle" of Newton can be solved along the lines on which our esteemed contributor, **Mr. George Godwin,** attempts it in this article. It is not by a study of the outer course of Newton's life and of his contacts with his contemporaries that the source of his inspiration can be uncovered, but rather by a study of that higher aspect of the mind known as the Intuition. Newton had apprehensions of truth which he did not make public, and much of what he did teach has been perverted in favour of materialism. The testimony of the late Lord Keynes, expressed in a manuscript on "Newton, the Man" is appended to Mr. Godwin's article as of interest in that connection.—ED.]

Isaac Newton had, it is perhaps too often forgotten, a strong mystical side to his unique intellectual make-up. By his forty-second year the corpus of his vast contribution to physical science was already made. In the many years of life still remaining to him he not only took but little interest in science, in which he stood pre-eminent, but often denigrated it as of little importance. Even while at the zenith of his tremendous intellectual powers he displayed a total indifference to what the world terms "success" and "fame." Even his greatest discovery, the Law of Gravity, remained unpublished for over two years.

How is it to be explained that the greatest scientific intellect of all time turned away from science and for more than thirty years devoted the major part of his time to such activities as the quest for the Philosopher's Tincture, the transmutation of metals and the interpretation of the prophets of the Old Testament and the study of such mystics as Swedenborg and Jacob Boehme?

This is, surely, one of the greatest psychological riddles of personality of all time. Perhaps we can obtain a clue to it by reference to a science little known in his day, but of vigorous growth in our own, namely, psychology.

Newton was a premature posthumous child. He was born weak and undersized. He never experienced the father-son relationship. He early displayed very pronounced characteristics pointing to a definite psychological type. He took no interest in ordinary boyish pursuits. He liked solitude. He felt no need of affection. He was absent-minded and indifferent to the opinions of others.

He early showed a genius for Mathematics, and, as this developed, he displayed, more and more, his indifference to his own genius in this direction. He preferred experiment to the realm of pure reason of mathematical enquiry.

He was excessively secretive and abnormally suspicious. He desired above all else to avoid conflict and

trouble of all kinds: he wanted to be left alone, and he was completely indifferent to fame, and to what the world thought of him.

Newton never married and there is no record of any woman in his life; nor yet of any close friend. He took no interest in politics or in the great contemporary figures of his age. It is said that he did not even know the name of the great Dean of St. Patrick's, Dublin. He regarded Art as nonsense and great sculpture was for him "great carved dolls." Music left him unmoved; the theatre left him yawning.

All this strongly suggests Nietzsche's "Objective man": it also suggests the schizoid personality. The schizoid is a psychological type by no means uncommon, and it is when the characteristics, which, in their sum, represent a turning away from life, become abnormally developed, that the split personality appears.

Did this happen in the case of Newton? There is ample evidence that for something like two years Newton was mentally deranged, though he appears to have made a good recovery. On the assumption of a schizoid derangement, this might be expected, since, with this type of derangement, the manifestation is most likely to appear out of the general character type under strain of some kind or another. Whether Newton suffered some such strain is not evident from the biographies. But it may be that his translation from the solitude of Cambridge to London, where his niece-housekeeper imported into his Jermyn Street establishment many great figures of the Town, oppressed the aging natural philosopher, at that period immersed in his investigation into the prophetic riddles of the Book of Daniel, the chronology of the Old Testament and much else remote from pure science.

For Newton there existed but one quest: the search for God, and for forty years he gave up his whole life to this end, science, the reconditioning of the coinage of the realm, and other tasks imposed on him by circumstance, being of little or no importance to him, but merely vexatious interruptions of his main pursuit. To Bentley he wrote: "While I wrote my Treatise about Our System, I had an eye upon such principles as might work with consideration for the belief of a Deity; and nothing can rejoice me more than to find it useful for that purpose." Likewise, in his celebrated treatise "Opticks," he suggests an ultimate "Intelligent agent," conceiving of God as a Being devoid of organs or parts.

Newton regarded science, natural philosophy, merely as a tool in the pursuit of the quest of God, regarding it as a method for the enlargement of man's moral philosophy. In other words, science had for Newton a moral purpose. Aside from this end object, he did not consider science as of any importance, nor was he interested in it after the period of his early efflorescence, the

dynamic period of the great discoveries.

When he turned from mathematics and physics to theology, he appears to have shed the objective, coldly appraising eye of the scientific genius, and to have reverted to the theological ideological level of his age. He accepted, for example, Bishop Usher's date of the Creation as a statement of science. Making no distinction between the events of known history and of mythology, he saw no distinction between the invasion of England by the Romans and the Expedition of the Argonauts, on the date of which he wasted much time.

Though in these enquiries Newton's great critical faculty seems to have slept, he did not accept the teaching of the Church. He rejected the doctrine of the virgin birth and of the divinity of Christ, holding that God was one and indivisible. He saw the Prophets as standing higher than any other category of interpreter of the divine will and of future events: in particular the prophet Daniel.

He held that reason in such matters was worthless without insight, placing that faculty above all other manifestations of the human intellect. He said that to reject the prophecies of Daniel was to reject Christianity, since it was founded on the prophecy concerning the coming of a Messiah. Of Christ he wrote: "Jesus Christ, being endowed with a nobler prophetic spirit than the rest, excelled also in this kind of speaking" (the prophetic).

Wetstein wrote:—

He studied the Codices, versions, Latin and Greek Fathers and ecclesiastical history that he almost reduced the question to a mathematical demonstration, a task which scarcely seemed possible to be effected by any man, and least of all by a person engaged in a totally different line of study."

This same mathematical method Newton applied to the mystic who, more than any other, influenced him, namely, the German cobbler-mystic, Jacob Boehme. This was a theoretical objective mysticism poles apart from the manifestations of the Catholic exponents. Boehme believed in a divine inner source of enlightenment; and, secondly, in the implanted desire to account for the eternal riddle of man's destiny in a world torn for ever between Good and Evil, Light and Darkness, Hope and Fear.

Boehme's system is complex, and Newton became absorbed in it, restating it in terms that revealed his innate mathematical bias. After his death the extent of Newton's work on the mysticism of Boehme was made apparent by the voluminous notes upon it found among his papers.

Newton's theology seems to have moved in the direction also of the theory of transmigration of souls. And among the analogies adduced by him were naïve examples such as the change of tadpole into frog, worm into butterfly. It is clear also that Newton definitely discarded the

doctrine of the Trinity. This thesis will be found in his "Notable Corruption of the Scriptures." He held that those passages of Timothy touching the Trinity, and others elsewhere, were later interpolations.

In his own day Newton was charged with the Socinian heresy. The Socinians were that sect which followed the anti-trinitarian doctrine of Lælius and Socinus, the sixteenth-century Italian theologians who held that Christ was the product of human seed implanted in his mother by God. In passing it is of interest to remark that here, perhaps, is the early seed of that movement which grew to become Rationalism. According to Newton the doctrine of the Trinity was first enunciated by the Council of Sardica. Nevertheless, it has been frequently argued that Newton was, in fact, an orthodox Christian.

Two factors tended to befog the issues in his own time. First his tardiness in publication and his habit of withdrawing what he had published; secondly, his avoidance of open controversy. He cared not a jot what men said or thought of him, his attitude towards all critics being rather that of the big dog who ignores the yapping of small dogs.

In many ways Newton had points of resemblance with Leonardo da Vinci. Both displayed certain characteristics of the schizoid personality; both were men of giant intellect, both were many-sided and able to turn from one interest to another with equal zest. Neither cared for wealth or fame. Both had a highly individual and somewhat secretive approach to religion. But there is, quite obviously, a real danger in flogging a comparison of this sort.

As he grew old Newton's character traits became more and more pronounced. He developed into a complete recluse. He neglected himself and sought only solitude and peace for the pursuit of his religious enquiries. "Philosophy," he wrote, "is such an impertinent litigious lady, that a man had as good be engaged in lawsuits as have to do with her."

Then came the letters which revealed the total eclipse of his judgment and the temporary dethronement of his reason. In these letters, addressed to several personages, including Locke, Newton revealed a deep-seated guilt feeling towards his correspondents. He asked forgiveness for imaginary transgressions against them, and caused at first bewilderment and then pity.

How is this breakdown to be explained?

In the schizoid-type character the inherent weakness may never declare itself at all. And it is likely enough that many schizoids pass through life unrecognised as such. The breakdown comes with the intolerable situation, the situation in which there is either a great loss or a dilemma of choice. Newton, it is known, displayed affection for his mother, though for no other human being, but that attachment was a

deep and far-reaching one. We know that he personally nursed her through a horrid and painful disease, and ministered to her tenderly. Therefore it may not seem unreasonable to suppose that it was the death of a beloved mother that brought about the two years of insanity which afflicted him. In any case, the theory has a good deal that is plausible to be said for it.

It is generally admitted that breakdowns of this sort in characters of this type have a fair percentage of cures, and so Newton's subsequent recovery still further supports the view, however tentatively put forward here.

Taken in their sum, Newton's theological writings suggest that, away from the realms of mathematics and physics, where he stood, and perhaps stands, alone, a great mountain amid the hills, he was neither a profound philosopher nor a percipient theologian. His life, one of eighty-two years, was devoted, as to the latter half of it, to a single-minded search for the living God. Side by side with this quest went another, that for the Philosopher's Tincture and all those curious and spurious ends to which alchemy addressed itself.

The ultimate secret of the nature of that God who was the subject of Newton's search for forty years must remain, as all mystical journeyings do, unknown and unknowable to other men. What we contemplate in awe is the spectacle of the greatest scientific intellect of all time valuing science so little as to turn from it like an idle boy from his play, to search the paths of mystical experience for the Unknown God.

GEORGE GODWIN

NEWTON, THE MAN

In the eighteenth century and since, Newton came to be thought of as the first and greatest of the modern age of scientists, a rationalist, one who taught us to think on the lines of cold and untinctured reason.

I do not see him in this light. I do not think that any one who has pored over the contents of that box which he packed up when he finally left Cambridge in 1696 and which, though partly dispersed, have come down to us, can see him like that. Newton was not the first of the age of reason. He was the last of the magicians, the last of the Babylonians and Sumerians....

Why do I call him a magician? Because he looked on the whole universe and all that is in it *as a riddle*, as a secret which could be read by applying pure thought to certain evidence, certain mystic clues which God had laid about the world to allow a sort of philosopher's treasure hunt to the esoteric brotherhood. He believed that these clues were to be found partly in the evidence of the heavens and in the constitution of elements...but also partly in certain papers and traditions handed down by the brethren in an unbroken chain back to the original cryptic revelation in Babylonia. He

regarded the universe as a cryptogram set by the Almighty—just as he himself wrapt the discovery of the calculus in a cryptogram when he communicated with Leibnitz. By pure thought, by concentration of mind, the riddle, he believed, would be revealed to the initiate.

He *did* read the riddle of the heavens. And he believed that by the same powers of his introspective imagination he would read the riddle of the Godhead, the riddle of past and future events divinely foreordained, the riddle of the elements and their constitution from an original undifferentiated first matter, the riddle of health and immortality.

I believe that the clue to his mind is to be found in his unusual powers of continuous concentrated introspection....His peculiar gift was the power of holding continuously in his mind a purely mental problem until he had seen straight through it. I fancy his pre-eminence is due to his muscles of intuition being the strongest and most enduring with which a man has ever been gifted....I believe that Newton could hold a problem in his mind for hours and days and weeks until it surrendered to him its secret. Then being a supreme mathematical technician he could dress it up, how you will, for purposes of exposition, but it was his intuition which was pre-eminently extraordinary—" so happy in his conjectures," said de Morgan, " as to seem to know more than he could possibly have any means of proving." The proofs, for what they were worth, were, as I have said, dressed up afterwards—they were not the instrument of discovery.

There is the story of how he informed Halley of one of his most fundamental discoveries of planetary motion. " Yes," replied Halley, " but how do you know that? Have you proved it? " Newton was taken aback, " Why, I've known it for years," he replied. " If you'll give me a few days, I'll certainly find you a proof of it "—as in due course he did.

Again, there is some evidence that Newton in preparing the *Principia* was held up almost to the last moment by lack of proof that you could treat a solid sphere as though all its mass was concentrated at the centre, and only hit on the proof a year before publication. But this was a truth which he had known for certain and had always assumed for many years.

Certainly there can be no doubt that the peculiar geometrical form in which the exposition of the *Principia* is dressed up bears no resemblance at all to the mental processes by which Newton actually arrived at his conclusions.

KEYNES

CULTURAL INHERITANCE—NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL

[**Dr. John Clark Archer,** Hoober Professor of Comparative Religion at Yale University, U.S.A., writes here on an important and congenial theme. Professor Archer's literary output in this field has been considerable, and includes *Mystical Elements in Mohammed, Youth in a Believing World, Faiths Men Live By* and *The Sikhs in Relation to Hindus, Moslems, Christians and Ahmadiyyas: A Study in Comparative Religion.* Such an article is of practical value in preparing men's minds for the recognition that there must be one truth which finds expression in the various religions—a corollary of the proposition that the root of all mankind is one.—ED.]

The world is full of a number of things which should be defined with reference to each other and judged eventually—a far harder task—with reference to any basic unity wherein their true meanings lie. We have all learned by this time that the world is one in the sense of an earthly globe, but it took us long to learn it.

Is there to be a unity to match the whirling sphere ? If so, where *can* it be ? The common man, of course, makes no total calculation, is not in search of unity. The uncommon man may even now be seeking it, but it is clear he has not yet either discovered or devised it.

We raise the question now in terms of CULTURE : Is it to be the means and guarantee of true oneness in the world ? The word came into English from the ancient Latin tongue in which it may have meant at first the culture of the earth, but its meaning inevitably grew. We would not lose the figure, for higher culture is closely linked with agriculture. We use the word in this little essay in the higher sense, matching, perhaps, in other tongues such words as *shiksha* and *tarbiyat* which can be made to stand for elevated thoughts and subtler qualities, for cultivation which has borne fruit in learning ; whence, persons possessed of thoroughgoing knowledge and matured by wide experience, whether by travel and human association or by widely-ranging intellectual quest and contemplation. And we venture to define the term with certain national and international connotations.

If we undertake at once some controversy over what the term may cover, we should indicate that we hold no notion that the mind of man is everywhere the same. We should account for differences at different stages of the mind's development in different areas around the globe, whatever just resemblances are found in man's ideas and practices, despite the vast extent of their dispersion—for, no matter where he is, " a man's a man for a' that. " In

fact, we should set out to find our unity amidst diversity—and sometimes despite disparity—no matter what degree of psychological identity might be established. We should find this unity through the transmission and interplay of cultures more than through any character purely psychological. Furthermore, we seek a unity in which diversity persists, believing that only unity of this sort is or can be permanent and creative.

We are on the way to such a unity, if we levy lawful toll upon the world's resources. We should know to what extent we are already the "heirs of all the ages," for there is scant value or satisfaction in being but the unconscious product of the past. We may be, if we will, the heirs of what those foreign to us have enjoyed and are enjoying from out of their own tradition—this is the leading aspect of the international problem. *Whatever the national culture, it is not the ultimate. International culture is more to be desired.* It is superlative, but by no means superficial. What is superficial is not culture. Nor is any culture static. International culture may not be ultimate. In its very progress culture creates new human goals. It may sometimes be destructive, destroying evil for the sake of good. Whatever culture actually increases should be good, but culture is always qualitative, seldom quantitative. Uncontrolled increase of human population, for example, may mean the loss of culture. Culture looks beyond mere bulk, beyond machines and factories and their output, for example, even as in quality it looks beyond the classes of mankind—although culture, after all, must be embodied.

Culture is a simplifying, humbling process, even while it modifies and elevates its subjects, even while it may diversify the human elements it works upon. One man, for instance, may be possessed of insight; another, of sympathy and understanding. Here may be courageous leadership to rally a timid but highly gifted populace, and there may be the mystic who would flavour all men's acts with contemplation. Culture speaks in various living languages, or provides men wisdom in tongues no longer spoken. It makes translations possible and current, through which men share among themselves draughts from many fountain-heads of knowledge. Culture need never require a single language medium. It may work otherwise toward the human intellect's perfection. Nor may it ever need to cast in its lot with any sort of human uniformity. It may indeed work toward man's perfection, toward the full use of men's capacities, but by the very nature of culture's creative process it is not a stream which runs to one dead sea; it is like a wind which lifts men to peaks and points of vision as varied as goodness and love are in themselves. Culture will teach men everywhere what men know or have known anywhere. Responsive to it, the truly cultivated man knows the

superb value of his own inheritance, maintains his loyalty thereto, and yet becomes a citizen of all the world—*if* a truly international citizenship can be established.

Take comparative religion, for example, as a type of culture, or any one religion as in and of a culture of its own. Then what has been said of culture generally must be applied at once again. And once again we emphasise the higher levels of religion, the religions which singly have represented progress, inspiration toward reform, and spiritual achievement. Every great religion has sought in some way to make the perfect man, and those now living keep this goal in mind, if not in actual view. And we can raise among them the question of their relations toward each other and of their relation to what may be still larger than themselves. It is but commonplace to remind ourselves of the several geographic regions where ancient cultures—and their religions—flourished, sometimes as officially established " faiths and orders, sometimes hoping to be universal cults. Something basic was long ago deposited, for example, in India and China—and elsewhere as well—and various religions have sprung from, or have entered from without into, these basic cultures.

It has happened that what was long ago Sinitic or Confucian has remained for the most part in China —although we may not ignore the Confucian influence in Japan and Indo-China. Hinduism—or something Indic—has been content in general to linger in its own vast and variegated subcontinent of India, while Buddhism, springing out of Indic soil and lingering long in India, obeyed some quiet and puzzling impulse to expand elsewhere, the remnants of it left meanwhile in the homeland fading gradually into the light of the common Hindu day. Neither Hinduism nor Buddhism has been a national cult, the one being in theory international, the other being so in theory and practice. And both are large in bulk.

Judaism and the faith of Zoroaster, on the other hand, whatever their initial past, professing to be universal, have had to demonstrate their gospel with limited resources, and yet their influence has been felt in distant, widely separated lands. Islam was a national faith—by Muhammad's own intention—and seems actually to be still somewhat provincial, in spite of former imperial dimensions and the wide international belt it occupies today. There can be no question, nevertheless, of its tremendous influence.

Christianity bulks the largest nowadays, having enjoyed the most unusual opportunities for expansion. It has developed everywhere but near its birthplace. It has known "establishment," both of national and colonial character, and lays responsibly the claim to being international—or, as the word is for the moment, ecumenical. It might lay claim in truth to being universal, were it not for its multitude of sects

and subdivisions. But what of the other faiths? Will any one religion finally preëmpt the field?

The conclusion we are coming to is this: Even as cultures have developed here and there and should be shared by cultivated men for their mutual and constructive benefit, so also the great religions will have made their contributions to the moral and religious progress of mankind. The religions of the present may be shared by all who are spiritually in earnest and in quest of whatever highest value they may call by any name. This need not, will not, call for the weakening of a man's devotion to his inherited religion—assuming that he will enlarge his own beloved inheritance. It will require him to make the most of the highest he was heir to, and he will demand, in turn, that the highest in other faiths, in all religions, shall prevail, making men truly thus the heirs of all the ages. This, to be sure, is a hard saying, one not soon to be understood among the masses, but worthy of acceptation among all the cultured, worthy of commission mentally and in practical association with the devotees of every faith, whatever the rightful expectation of higher good and further truth as culture and religion grow.

Perhaps one phase alone of this gigantic, puzzling situation might be used as an illustration of the whole. Let every cultivated devotee—never, however, without his sense of obligation toward those less cultivated in his faith, for culture and religion are not objects of devotion merely in themselves—study his own faith zealously and fruitfully, *and at the same time* study with equal zeal and thoroughness at least one other great religion to which he can find direct and fruitful access through its own members and resources. The sources may be chiefly literary, but the writings may be used with care. Indeed, it may occur to him that his own religious education has been very indirect—through some language, for example, quite foreign to the early scripture text. He may conclude that his own faith has come mostly by inheritance, and he may determine to make it more immediately his own.

Through various authentic channels he may gain acquaintance with some other faith. He need not be a "convert" to that faith—certainly, at least, not in the common sense of substitution, for religion in its deeper essence is not thus subject to division. The man of one religion sincerely seeks to understand another, to find whatever may be common to the two. He may indeed go on to seek what is universal in religion. He will soon declare himself, in any case, a debtor to what has come from without into his own stream of culture and religion. Who, indeed, what Christian, or Muslim, or Buddhist, can justly say he is not debtor to something Greek, Iranian, Jewish or Hindu? Nor can the Jew, the Parsi, the Hindu, or any other escape the debtor's oath. It really does not matter greatly if one finds

among the many faiths contrasts, dialectical procedure, competition and compromise—he will indeed find all these and more, as he makes comparisons and passes judgments. The major matter is that in doing so he becomes a better, more cultivated and religious man. And he will doubtless learn, also, while remaining loyal to his own inheritance, that his ultimate perfection awaits all other men's perfection. Somehow culture and religion must advance the common good, and if there is progress under way, no one who sees and shares it will despair.

If to gain these higher ends it is not explicitly essential for a man to "change his faith" (Let him do it, if he will, but with a full transfer of loyalty), how can the ends be won ? One may have recourse to the usual expediency of learning, with due respect for what one faces in the quest. A man need not accept another's total creed or practice wholly any other ritual. He finds ideas among the creeds and sees the symbolism of the rites. Where indeed is one to find the *final* creed ? What ritual is perfect ? Forms, including words, are fragmentary, often superficial—meant ofttimes for those of weaker intellect but genuine devotion. Cultivated men may use them in a wholesome, ideal way for the sake of fellowship, perhaps, while giving to them their own interpretation, looking far beyond them to the larger, more inspiring truths. It is expedient, at least, to bear a name, to be included in a roll, even as also nationality is something valid. Men cannot be mere theorists, disregarding lawful bonds and bounds. Idealism of a superficial, sentimental sort is not progressive.

But both culture and religion must discriminate. They should transcend all boundaries to this extent, at least: Making wars impossible, preventing men's hating one another, blocking unfair economic dealings among various communities, making impossible on any nation's part neglect of any of its own inhabitants or of any human need throughout the earth, and intolerance of any official or unworthy interference in matters of sincere devotion to religion and moral conduct. Nor will they stop at sheer negation. As positive factors in the peoples' welfare they will engender understanding, sympathy and brotherhood beyond all natural and artificial boundaries, inspiring and directing men toward what is truly national, international and universal, and, above all else, interpreting the universal in terms of God.

JOHN CLARK ARCHER

KALIDASA'S CONCEPT OF BEAUTY

[The lecture which **Shri S. Ramachandra Rao**, Lecturer in Sanskrit at the Central College, Bangalore, delivered on March 4th, 1948, at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, is published here in somewhat condensed form to meet our space limitations. His reading of the development which brought Kalidasa to the recognition of moral beauty as the highest is very interesting and suggestive.—ED.]

Of the many nations of the past, two were outstanding seekers after truth. They were the ancient Indians and the early Greeks. The ancient Indians in the Vedas showed that the gods were true and that they were the guardians of Ṛta or the moral order. It was man's duty to propitiate the gods to obtain their grace. Addressing the god of fire, a seer sings :—

"O Self-effulgent God, Thou dost confer all good things upon the man who offers his all to Thee. Granting such great gifts is quite in accordance with Thy divine nature."

(*Rig-Veda*, M. 1, S. 1)

The Upanishadic seers next said that Brahman was the Truth—"*Satyam Brahma*" and declared that the attempt of the human being should be directed towards the realisation of this truth. Then came the great epic writers of India, Vālmīki and Vyāsa. They pointed out in their turn that Dharma was the truth. They declared in unambiguous terms that this Dharma or righteousness was the principle which sustained the world and helped it to progress. Rama and the Pandavas espoused the cause of Dharma and succeeded while Rāvana and the Kauravas adopted the opposite cause and perished. Dharma was the burden of the Indian epic song.

It was then that Kālidāsa came into the field to give a completely different idea of the Truthful. Poet as he was, he felt that the beautiful was the truthful; and the whole of his lifetime was devoted to the establishment of this remarkable idea. The poetic instinct in him impelled him to look around to see nature and to experience the delights provided by it. With a view to communicating such delights of his experience, he sang about the seasons in the *Ritusamhāra*. However, when he reviewed the work, he did not find it satisfying; for the descriptions happened to be photographic. There was not the painter's touch in it. He discovered that he had merely recorded nature and had not seen the beauties of nature with an imaginative eye. Besides, external beauty, however attractive, did not count much when bereft of the human element. The repeated references to the "Lovers" in the work was after all conventional. Kālidāsa felt, therefore, the want of the human element in it as

also the lack of the imaginative.

He improved his ideas in his next work—"The Cloud Messenger." In this great work of art, he not only recorded the beauties of nature but also viewed them with the painter's eye. The beauty of the external object touched and clothed with imagination differentiated the *Mêghasamdêśa* from the *Ritusamhāra*. The flight of a cloud over mountains is a common experience; but see how it stirs Kālidāsa's imagination! Addressing the cloud, the Yaksha says :—

"Soar into the sky, with your face to the North, from here—a place wet with *Nichulas*, your movement gazed at with wonder by the Siddha damsels with their faces held up to see if the wind was bearing away the peak of the mountain!" (*Mêgh.* I. 14)

Besides this imaginative element, there were other reasons which went to make the *Mêghasamdêśa* a great work of art. The poet brought nature and man closer here by making a cloud the Yaksha's messenger. In addition to this, the development of the mood of love in separation made the poem tender. Nor was this all. This tender theme was given the most suitable garb. The *Mandākrāntha* metre adopted by the poet with its majestic and mellifluous movement takes the reader into a veritable world of ecstasy. The tenth stanza of the *pūrva Megha* is a typical instance. With such a delightful combination, the "Cloud Messenger" became a fine specimen of objective beauty.

Finding objective beauty attractive, Kālidāsa pursued the subject further in his *Vikramôrvaśīyam*—a remarkable drama. He worked up external beauty to perfection and succeeded in grasping it in that rare poem of excellence which appears in the concluding portion of the Fourth Act. What a rare collection of the beautiful Kālidāsa crowds in here! King Purūravas whose handsome appearance had captured the heart of the divine damsel, Urvasi, who in her turn had outshone the beauty of even the Goddess Lakshmi, wishes to travel home in "an aerial chariot formed out of a fresh cloud, having pictures all round, its walls painted in rainbow colours and flashes of lightning forming its streamers"!

Thus in the "Cloud Messenger" and the *Vikramôrvaśīyam* in general and the verse quoted above in particular, the poet realised all aspects of external beauty. He achieved the well-nigh impossible. He grasped the elusive thing, beauty. Thus, though he had done by now the unthinkable, yet he felt dissatisfied. There were three distinct reasons for this. First, Beauty, when grasped, was found to have limitations. When conquered, it ceased to be attractive; and Kālidāsa wanted it to be the Thing ever elusive and ever sought after. It pained him to think that he had mastered beauty; for he had nothing further to do thereafter. Secondly, the enjoyment of external beauty led to *ennui*. King Purūravas found himself in that

state. Kālidāsa wanted beauty not to defeat man but to be purposeful in principle and forceful in its drive. Thirdly, however beautiful the "Cloud Messenger" appeared to him to be, he discovered on reviewing the lyric that its structure was built on slender foundations. He found that he was singing the story of one who had erred! The very first stanza betrayed the error of the Yaksha—"*Svādhikā-rāt pramattaha.*" It may be sweet to sing the tender mood of love; but not when that love rests on weak foundations. For, we are told that the Yaksha suffered separation from his wife because he had failed to do his duty of watching properly the garden of his Master, Kubera. Loving husband as he was, one day he left his post of duty to keep the company of his wife. The result was disastrous. Indra's elephant entered the garden and trampled down the flower-beds. The Master, when he heard of this, cursed the warder to suffer separation from his wife for a period of one year. The poet's æsthetic sense did not find satisfying beauty from the mood of love, sung of by one who had not done his duty.

The poet overcame the first difficulty by introducing the suggestive element in the creation of objective beauty. This suggestive element extended the borders of objective beauty, imparted depth to it and kept it beyond the human grasp. Thus beauty remained the elusive thing and remained ever attractive. In describing Urvasi, the beautiful, the poet denies the authorship for her creation to Brahma whose "wits were dulled by the study of the Vedas." "May it be the Moon of lovely brightness who created her?" he asks; or "Was it Cupid—the embodiment of the sentiment of Love? Or was it the Spring rich in flowers?" (*Vik.* Act I, St. 8) In thus describing Urvasi, the poet was suggesting the charm of the Moon, the beauty of Cupid and the delicacy of the Spring in the person of Urvasi. And Urvasi became not merely an object of beauty, but also a symbol of beauty, ever stirring the imagination of the contemplator of beauty. At the same time Kālidāsa realised the value of establishing objective beauty on truthful foundations. A poet stands to lose by describing an object of beauty that never exists. The beauty of such an object would be as real as the proverbial "horns of a hare." But Kālidāsa was always truthful. He knew it as a fact of nature that when "vernal beauty stands between infancy and youth, the Kurabaka flower will be whitish-red at the top and black at its sides; the Asoka blossom red and ready to burst and the new mango sprout greyish at its tips with pollen."

The poet became successful in overcoming the remaining causes of dissatisfaction by singing about perfect and purposeful Love. The story of the love and wedlock of Pārvathi with Śiva served well his purpose. In the divine pair, Pārvathi and Parameshwara, who represent the true Indian concept of love, Kālidāsa

did not see disharmony, a thing which he had discovered in the episode of the Yaksha. Nor was the noble love of the divine pair without fruition. When Kumara was born as their son, the world felt relieved and the fate of the demon Taraka was sealed.

While describing the attempt of Pārvathi to secure Śiva as her husband in the *Kumarasambhava*, Kalidasa was struck by yet another aspect of her effort. When Parvathi depended upon her extraordinary graces for winning Śiva's attentions, she miserably failed. The help rendered to her by the Cupid couple and Vasantha went in vain. Nay, instead of securing the object of her desire, she found Cupid in ashes and his sweet wife in sorrow. It was then that she opened her eyes to the limitations of her external beauty and that which she failed to obtain by beauty, she succeeded in obtaining by penance. Śiva not only consented to marry her but also declared himself to be ever at her service.

In the theme which had unfolded itself thus, Kālidāsa saw the limitations of external beauty and found conduct more beautiful. For Śiva fell in love with Parvathi not because of her rare external graces but because of her devotion. The poet's opinions on the limitations of external beauty found support even in his play, the *Vikramôrvaśīyam*. While he was impressed by the beauties of external nature which the play presented, the impression made upon him by the conduct and behaviour of the chief Queen, the daughter of Kaśirāja, was deeper. For was not the Queen prepared to sacrifice her all for securing happiness to her husband? "*Atmanana Sukhāvasanêna aryaputram nirvrita Sariram kartum Itchāmi*. Nor was Purūravas slow in discovering the greatness of this woman. He confesses to the Jester that his regard for the Queen is not lessened by the love he has for Urvasi. In brief, Kālidāsa found objective beauty as represented by Urvasi less attractive than subjective beauty as symbolised by the chief Queen.

At this stage, naturally, the conflict arose in his mind as to which form of beauty was more attractive —the subjective or the objective? His mind, which was already vaguely conscious of the limitations of objective beauty, clinched the issue in the *Abhignana Sakuntalam*. In Act II, King Dushyanta is discovered seated with his friend, the Jester. He had abandoned all thought of the hunt by now and was all eagerness instead to talk to the Vidushaka of the beauties of the newly seen hermit girl, Sakuntala. "Madhavya," says the King, opening the conversation, "Your eyes have not been fruitful, as they have not seen that which deserves to be seen" (*Darsanīyam na drishtam*). Pat came the suggestive reply from the friend —"Why! Your Majesty stands before me!" The King, who felt confused for a moment by this quick and unexpected wise reply, exclaim-

ed "Everybody considers as beautiful that which he likes." In this context in general and the sentence in particular could be discovered Kālidāsa's real opinion of the beautiful. It was explained in terms of the behaviour of the King and his friend. What attracted Dushyanta to Sakuntala was her great beauty and what made the Jester like the King was the kindness and affection which he received from him. To the King the beautiful was Sakuntala and to the Jester the beautiful was Dushyanta. It was the mind, therefore, that made a thing an object of beauty. If the human mind so decides, even the object which possesses the rarest type of external beauty, ceases to be beautiful. The mind thus is the deciding factor.

Starting from this important resolve, Kālidāsa detected that the mind was more attracted by subjective beauty rather than objective. The conduct or the attitude of an Umā or of a Dêvī stirred up his soul more than the external beauty of a newly formed cloud, or of a pleasure garden, or even of an Urvasi for that matter. Therefore, from that moment, the poet set himself to the task of singing the moral conduct of man, for he found it beautiful and derived satisfaction from it.

His first attempt, however, left him disappointed. His Agnimitra might have been a wise, tactful and benevolent King, but he went on marrying. To the cultured mind of Kālidāsa which highly appreciated monogamy, the activities of an Agnimitra held no attractions. For a similar reason, he did not find much pleasure in Purūravas either. Thus finding the *Malavikagni-mitra* and the *Vikramorvaśiyām* unhelpful, he sought shelter in his third drama, the *Abhignana Sakuntalam*. Here Kālidāsa's attention turned towards the great mortal Dushyanta. The poet in him delighted in picturing a man who committed no mistakes in tempting situations. While hunting in the forest, the King saw the beautiful hermit maiden and fell in love with the excellence of her charm. But even in that tempting moment, he pauses to reflect upon his conduct. For, how could he, as a Kshatriya, dare to enter into wedlock with a Brahmana girl of the penance grove? He took a correct decision nevertheless. "Undoubtedly," he argued within himself, "This maiden is fit to be wedded to a Kshatriya, since my cultured mind has a longing for her; for in matters of doubt, the inclinations of their hearts are the deciding authority to the good." It was not long ere he heard from Anasūya that Sakuntala was Kausika's daughter and hence a Kshatriya herself. A more trying situation occurred when Sakuntala was brought before the King, and was announced as his wife. Her fascinating beauty compelled his attention, but he hardly remembered his marriage with her, being a victim of the Sage Durvasa's curse. His mental conflict is thus analysed—"Not knowing whether the beauty which is thus presented to me, was

or was not accepted before, I am unable either to enjoy or to reject it, like a bee at dawn the Kunda flower with dew within." Finally, much to the dismay of his attendants he rejects her. Such wise and correct decisions taken in tempting circumstances made Dushyanta a King worthy of respect. But the total impression produced in the mind of the poet by the *Sakuntalam* was not happy. The drama described the woes of an innocent maiden; and, though Dushyanta was not directly responsible for her sorrows, he could never run away from the charge. Besides, the picture of a repentant King was depressing. Though the King's character appeared beautiful, it was not invigorating. This made the poet think of the Kings of the Raghu dynasty in general and then of Rāma in particular. The *Raghuvamśa* was the result.

Kālidāsa saw satisfying beauty in the perfect character of Rāma. In the *Raghuvamśa* he focuses the attention of the reader on two important incidents in the life of Rāma. The first relates to the abandonment of Sīta. Rāma heard from his reporters that "the citizens praised his conduct except his receiving back the Queen who had dwelt in the palace of the Rākshasa." Rāma felt perturbed on hearing the report. He had decided to be an ideal King and this meant that he should please all his citizens without an exception. To do so would mean the abandonment of Sīta. But how could he abandon a wife whose chastity was vouched for by the God of Fire? Rāma decided nevertheless on abandoning Sīta. He thought that as a King his duty was first to please his people. He sacrificed his personal pleasure for it. Nor was it all. Rāma felt that, as an ideal King, he had to celebrate great sacrificial ceremonies. Without a wife, the Śastras declared that such ceremonies were not to be done. The King, who had abandoned Sīta, was in an insoluble dilemma. He met the situation by ordering a golden image of Sīta. With the image by his side, Rāma made the needful sacrifices and justified his ideal kingship.

Kālidāsa had vowed that he would establish his thesis that the beautiful was the truthful. In the development of his effort to establish truth, he was unconsciously suggesting that the truthful, the moral or the noble was the beautiful. He found satisfaction and delight in the moral ways of a Rāma or of a Dushyanta. It was then that he realised like Keats the reality that "Beauty is Truth; Truth Beauty." And from this the next step was not difficult to take. To his typical Indian mind, the significance of the statement of the *Bhagavad-Gita* became clearer—"Whatever is glorious, good, beautiful and mighty, understand thou That to be a fragment of my splendour." (*Gita*, X. 41). Kālidāsa ultimately conceived that the godly was the beautiful.

S. Ramachandra Rao

CHRISTIAN STAGNATION
BY AN EX-CHRISTIAN

[The arraignment of Church Christianity in this forthright article would be applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to orthodoxies of other types. Blind belief is blind belief, in whatsoever and by whomsoever it is held. **Mr. C. M. Turnbull** challenges the Western outlook and the Western way of life; many may condemn but few can gainsay his charges. But his article constitutes no less importantly a challenge to India, to which he and others in growing numbers in the West are looking to continue the demonstration begun by Gandhiji, of practice reconciled with precept—the demonstration which alone can convince even the sceptical of the superiority of a way of life resting upon truth. Modern Indians must not, dare not, disappoint the hopes of those who have lifted up their eyes to the hills from whence came Gandhiji's strength.—ED.]

I write this, not because my personal belief or unbelief is in itself of any value, but because it may help to show others that some of us in the West are becoming increasingly conscious of the terrible wrongness of our way of life.

Only we who have been born here and lived our lives here can fully realise the tragedy that faces the West today. It is not a question of war or peace, of life and death ; it is the very existence of the soul that is at stake. We have so long played the game of robbing Peter to pay Paul that our life has become one hideous lie. We distort Christ's teaching to suit our political and social habits—there is no truth in us. We can neither openly deny Christ, nor admit the wrongness of our ways—yet our way of life and that of Christ are completely incompatible. We refuse to acknowledge the value of the teachings of other great spiritual leaders—we wallow, with incredible self-satisfaction, in the grime of our own darkness.

The following words were written hastily, without thought for composition or style, and I give them as they came—the musings of an inevitably confused, but groping mind ; the mind of one born in darkness, but who is beginning to see and to believe.

I believe—not in God Almighty, maker of Heaven and Earth ; nor in the "onlyness" of his son, Jesus Christ, as the creed of my Church would have me believe. Christ never taught me to say this, and I most certainly do not believe in the almighty Church which insists on my reciting these words every Sunday.

Religion, spiritual life, what you will, is virtually non-existent in the West today. It has been displaced by a morass of dogma pumped out by a dictatorial Church. Now it is the fashion for the State to control our every action. I can't build a

shelter for my chickens out of my own bricks, with my own hands, and on my own land, without applying to my own Government for a licence. As the State controls my actions, so is the Church trying to control my thoughts.

Some branches and sects of the Christian faith exercise more control than others. I was brought up amongst people who considered themselves enlightened, broad-minded, fair and just, yet from the earliest time that I can remember—even as not much more than a babe in arms—I have had this insidious propaganda of a dogmatic Church forcibly, yet cunningly, injected into my blood.

As soon as I could walk, I walked, or rather was walked to Church, every Sunday. I enjoyed the walk, but how I hated sitting on a hard bench listening to words I could not understand. But it came as a matter of course—every Sunday I went to Church—it was an accepted fact—as much a part of my life as eating and drinking. That it meant nothing to me was of no importance.

By the time that I was old enough to understand things better, I was well drilled and disciplined, and I accepted what I heard in Church without query. I ate, I drank; breathed and slept; I went to Church—and now I believed—just like that. Why not? No arguments were put forward against what I heard—none that came to my ears anyway. What the priest said was true—I presumed that he had some form of communication with this God Almighty. Of the fact that there were other beliefs and theories—even inside my own Church—I was kept happily ignorant, so how should I believe otherwise than in the infallibility of this finely dressed priest, whose robes I had so long admired, and who forgave me my sins so royally?

As I said, during the early stages my head was filled with meaningless mumbo-jumbo, but now that I was old enough to begin to think I was taken aside regularly, and some form and shape was given to those meaningless words so firmly fixed in my mind. Then, with a number of other boys of the same age—about thirteen or fourteen—to Westminster Abbey, and there a benevolent old Bishop laid his hands on my head and told me that now I was a member of the holy Church, and could communicate with the Divine and be saved.

It was at about this time that I really began to think. "Except that thou...(do this and do that) thou shalt be eternally damned." How could this be true? Hell would have to be many times larger than Heaven. Then there were the mission hymns which we sang on occasion, that the "heathen lands afar" might see the light and be saved: were all these non-Christian people to be damned too?

Such is our ignorance, even today, of other religions and beliefs that many church-goers truly believe that there is no "salvation," no "way" whatsoever, except through the

Christian Church. You just cannot be a good man or woman unless you are a Christian. Alas, we have neglected Christ and followed our finely dressed spiritual leaders—we have so long accepted their word as being God's word that we are now blind to the truth.

In refusing to say the creed of the Church I apparently cease to be a Christian ; in saying that Christ is no more divine (and no less) than other great spiritual leaders, I am proclaimed a heathen—it is an honour.

Freed from dogma I can follow the truth, and really believe. I believe in good wherever it is to be found, be it in the teachings of Christ, in the *Gita*, the *Koran* or the *Dhammapada*. Fundamentally I believe it to be the same truth that underlies all these.

The West is fettered by its beliefs, *i.e.*, the teachings of Christ, which are incompatible with its politics, so it excuses them, and the Church aids and abets by presenting an interpretation of these beliefs which does not clash too violently with the particular political and social set-up in existence.

Thus the Church condones and excuses mass murder, executions, State control, and a whole host of other unsavoury aspects of our life which the State insists upon as necessary for the order of things, but which Christ condemned. Leo Tolstoy has ably pointed this out, and in India that truly great soul, Gandhiji, did likewise by casting off dogma and convention, and following the truth that was within him.

In the West we are told that we are weak and sinful, that we need constant guidance from without ; thus is cast around our necks the noose by which we are dragged through life—the truth choked out of us. Why not consider the good and the strength in us ? In even the weakest amongst us there is goodness to be developed. True that many do need guidance, but guidance should take the form of pushing, not pulling ; the ignorant should be pushed from behind, so that they can see where they are going, they should be pushed until they discover the truth for themselves, instead of having a carefully arranged version of the truth forced down their throats. I have seen, in the wake of this last war, many apparently degraded and despicable half-human creatures who, given encouragement, have shown a finer spirit of truth and of love than many a dignified churchgoer—it bites right into the heart to see these miserable beings exhibit more love and compassion and gentleness than the mass of prim and proper churchmen ever dream of.

With the death of Gandhiji many of us in the West were jolted to our senses—we suddenly realised that here was a person (and millions with him) who had refused to lie to himself any longer, but had followed instead the truth, without wavering.

If more of us followed and obeyed our consciences rather than a set of complicated laws and regulations

there would be more peace and good-will in the world. There is no need to be "antisocial" to do this—there is no need for anything but a belief in the inner goodness that underlies all humanity, and in the same inner voice that will guide us all alike, given the chance. Gandhiji and his followers gave the soul of mankind this chance, and showed clearly what great things can be achieved by constant adherence to the truth rather than to the law. If we all followed the Truth, the rift between our religion and our social system would disappear. If we all followed our conscience there would be remarkable conformity of action, and a good deal less lawlessness than there is at present, because the law and the injunctions of our conscience would be one and the same thing.

No one is perfect, we all have our faults and should recognise them, but the sooner we stop telling ourselves what wretched, frail sinners we are, and trusting our physical and spiritual fate to the hands of dictators no less wretched and frail, the better. A country like India is lucky in having more enlightened leaders than we in the West have ever had; there is a greater harmony between the precepts of the conscience (national and individual) and those of the law; more important still, there is opportunity for reconciling once and for all that which is preached and that which is practised. If India can do this, it will be the greatest gift a nation has ever given the world.

Those of us in the West—and we are growing in number—who believe that India can do this, are watching with a certain anxiety the pangs of a nation in the process of industrialisation. The outcome in the West was the spiritual stagnation of the people—we allowed ourselves to become physically stereotyped, and finally surrendered our minds to the monster of mass production that we might conform, the one with the other and all with the State, both physically and mentally—and now we are utterly barren.

There is something dreadfully wrong with the Western way of life—it leads inevitably to the destruction of body and of mind. Instead of professing faith in a way leading to chaos we should be able to act in accord with the light within; we should rather say, with due humility, "I believe in myself," and when we see the truth in others try to discover it for ourselves, instead of slavishly imitating it. Perhaps the spirit of India, ancient and modern, will show us how.

C. M. TURNBULL

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

ON IDEAS *

The publication of this important work is an event in the field of scholarship, and more particularly in the world of what I will call applied philosophy. There is something intensely special in the study of the concept of "idea." It has grown to a much wider range of interpretation than that discussed by the "pure" philosopher. Using the jargon of modern science in its relations to application, we may therefore fairly speak of this field of study as "applied philosophy," and so we may also refer to the history of ideas as one aspect of the evolution of applied philosophy.

There may perhaps be something challenging in this. Philosophy is so essentially a fundamental, so necessarily a logical discussion of the foundations of knowledge and of conduct, that to speak of "applied" philosophy may be to offend the philosophical purist. The term is reasonable, nevertheless. The concept of ideas lies at the core of the structure of human intellectual development; and therefore equally the history of ideas must provide the clues, and indeed the mainspring, to the intellectual aspects of the evolution of civilisation.

It is a commonplace that the term "idea," derived originally from the Greek, "*to see*," has from early days developed a variety of meanings, both to the philosopher and to "the man in the street." But all have in common some element of either a mental picture or a mental process. Philosophers through the years have clearly had to address themselves to the task of definition and explanation. "The reproduction with a more or less adequate image of an object not actually present to the senses," say Stout and Baldwin in their *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology;* but according to whether we refer to Plato, or Locke, or Hume, or others of the great philosophers of history, the nature of this conception of "idea" differs widely in fundamentals, ranging from Plato's view that it is an archetype of which the objects of the human senses are necessarily imperfect copies, and towards which human perfection strives, to Locke's definition, in his "Essay on the Human Understanding," of "whatever is the object of understanding when a man thinks."

Actually, however, there is more in the history of ideas as developed by Professor Lovejoy than that which we have above described as "applied philosophy." Used in a wider sense, the "idea" concept which emerges from the field of "pure" philosophy, to be developed as "applied," may nevertheless be a fundamental as distinct from an "application," in relation to intellectual activities that derive from philosophical considerations. This will be evident from the very genesis of the History of Ideas Club under whose ægis this important volume of

* *Essays in the History of Ideas.* By ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY. (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore; Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, London. 359 pp. 1948. $5.00 and 27*s.* 6*d.*)

essays has been published. We quote its official aims as follows :—

> The historical study of the development and influence of general philosophical conceptions, ethical ideas, and æsthetical fashions, in occidental literature, and of the relations of these to manifestations of the same ideas and tendencies in the history of philosophy, of science, and of political and social movements.

Here indeed is a wide and generous charter of intellectual study—and it is one that has been pursued by the author and his colleagues with distinction and success. The History of Ideas Club was founded twenty-six years ago, in January 1923, by Professor Lovejoy at the Johns Hopkins University. This was no ordinary "society" off-shoot of university life such as so frequently exists to cater for the intellectual or quasi-intellectual pastime of undergraduates. It was intended to appeal to as wide a circle of philosophical scholarship as possible, and its membership was open to any one, irrespective of whether he belonged to the University or not, competent to contribute to the aims above described.

The volume under review is the handsome tribute the History of Ideas Club pays to its distinguished founder. Professor Lovejoy assumed "Emeritus" status in 1938, but he has at all times remained the inspirer of the Club's activities and the Editor of its Journal. What is the secret of the admiration and esteem "from coast to coast," in striking testimony to which, for example, an appendix to the volume lists some ten pages of names of those who have subscribed to it in advance of publication? As Professor D. C. Allen reminds us in his foreword, it is that where so many philosophers and historians have been content to discuss the theme of ideas narrowly and with bias, Professor Lovejoy has maintained a high level of objectivity and has at all times shown a sense of penetration and a capacity for analysis that have enriched the subject, and, what is equally important, have stimulated his colleagues and co-workers.

The collection of essays that this volume comprises consists in the main of selected reprints of "reflections on the nature, methods and difficulties of the historiography of ideas." These cover a wide ground and are representative of the author's writings extending over a number of years. They are not set out in chronological order, nor do they develop the progressive elements of a theme. But in a sense they are interrelated. Thus, for example, Essay IX on "Herder and the Enlightenment Philosophy of History," one of the few in the volume previously unpublished, carries with it a note relating it to "those numbered VI, II, III, VIII, X and XV." This is not to imply that the foundations of a common purpose are not there. Indeed they are, and they may perhaps be summed up as the "endeavour to investigate the history, and thereby, it may be hoped, to understand the better the nature of the workings of the human mind." It is of special interest to note that while the essays cover a range of enquiry into special topics fields, a synthesis of general conceptions does emerge, in the view of the author, in the form of "some underlying common assumptions and procedures." These are traversed in the introductory essay on "The Historiography of Ideas," but the author, in his illuminating preface, enunciates three "general or frequently recurrent phenomena in the history of

ideas, of which the various essays may be regarded as offering particular illustrations." Indeed it is most essential that the reader should absorb most carefully the substance of both preface and introductory paper if the full fruits of the succeeding essays are to be enjoyed.

This volume is not for the dilettante reader. Here is no bed-time story. But for those who are clear of head and sound in basic judgment and critical faculty, a wealth of stimulation will repay the hard concentration of time and thought that is called for.

IVOR B. HART

Philosophy of Literature. By GUSTAV E. MUELLER. (Philosophical Library, New York. $3.50)

This work is profound in concept and brilliant in execution. An exuberance of ideas, thought-packed passages lit with the beauty of words, make it rewarding reading. Some critics might complain that Prof. Mueller invests creative minds with thought-patterns projected from his own, that he reads too much in the blank spaces between lines, and gives art an astringent quality which is contrary to pure æsthetic enjoyment. It cannot, however, be denied that often enough there is philosophy in great art (I am aware of exceptions) as there is art in great philosophy (exceptions again). And the author of *Philosophy of Literature*, at any rate, jerks his readers to a reassessment of fixed literary values, jerks them hard.

Homer, Platonism, Lucretius, Dante, the Renaissance, Hamlet, Goethe's *Faust*, and onward to Dostoevsky and Thoman Mann (*Lotte in Weimar*) and Hermann Hesse—such is the range of themes expounded in these pages. The author's method may be illustrated by reference to the chapter on Hamlet. He is not satisfied with the idealistic and naturalistic theories on Hamlet's conduct, as advanced respectively by Schlegel (and Goethe) and Bradley. And he postulates:—

> The condition of Hamlet's tragedy is the unresolved dualism of good and evil, flesh and spirit, right and wrong, which conflict is such that, on the one hand, the wrong is to be righted, which purging, on the other hand, involves the destruction of the relatively higher value in the process. The greatness of man is wasted in overcoming evil, which is an evil because his own thinking and ambition inevitably "makes it so."

A word in passing. Hamlet invokes in my mind the image of Arjuna on Kurukhsetra field, for the Pandava Prince was Hamletesque in his own bewildered "to be or not to be." Of course the points of contact are few and the likeness is superficial. Yet it may be worth while for some writer to make a comparative study of ideas in *Hamlet* with a strand of Hindu thought as revealed in the *Mahabharata*.

The chapter on Herman Hesse holds special interest for Indian readers. Hesse's mother was born in India, the daughter of a missionary who was a scholar in the Indian languages and classics. From him Hesse seems to have gained his interest in Hindu and Buddhist philosophies, which became his lifelong study. Hesse visited India in 1911. "Poet of metaphysical twilight, Rembrandt of the word," he expressed certain obvious influences in *Siddhartha*, which is a major achievement. It is indeed strange that this great German writer is so little known in this country, though he has had due publicity as a recipient of the Nobel Prize in literature.

BHABANI BHATTACHARYA

A TALE OF MODERN PEKING*

There is an indefinable charm about this book, first published in 1944 and now reprinted for the third time. Those who want to know something of the intimacies of Chinese life, the thoughts and conversation of educated women, their weaknesses and their strength, will find here a simple story that is likely to interest them. It is told by an English lady returning to the scenes of her youth, and has the advantage of being based on fact. She went to China a year before the Japanese war broke out, and took the opportunity of revisiting two Chinese friends in Peking. They were middle-aged schoolmistresses in somewhat straitened circumstances, who arranged for their guest to be lodged in a pavilion attached to a neighbour's house, and took the utmost trouble to make it not only comfortable but charming in every respect. During the ensuing weeks we become well acquainted with Miss Way, a woman of singular nobility of soul, and her devoted assistant, Miss "Blossom" Lo. There is also an attractive niece, Crystal Lily, who at the age of 25 is already considered to be "high on the matrimonial shelf." A coloured portrait of her (imaginary, we gather) by Mr. Chiang Yee appears as frontispiece.

Little action of an exciting nature takes place, though a great number of things are discussed. There is a troublesome lawsuit which causes poor Miss Way much anxiety and expense; the appearance of young Mr. Ku, who eventually marries her niece; a visit to the Chinese theatre; a touching account of an old dependant saved from penury; and a few other episodes. But the chief attraction of the book lies in the daily conversations between the three elder women. Their different upbringing makes it only natural that they should not always think alike, and provides occasion for argument; but there is a certain innate goodness in them all which binds them together in mutual esteem. The particular quality that distinguishes the narrator herself is her gaiety and unfailing sense of fun. This goes well with a broad-minded religious tolerance, and even leads her to take part in a ceremony which makes her the "blood-sister" of her two friends, and to dance with them afterwards for sheer joy.

But, someone may ask, what of the title of the book? What relevance has it here? Not until the eighteenth chapter do we find out, when they all make an expedition to the Pool of the Emperor Ch'ien Lung—"a most lovely and memorable spot" a few miles out of Peking. On the eaves of a nearby summer pavilion are written three characters in gold, meaning "Cleanse your Hearts." And Lady Hosie records how their hearts did indeed feel "purged and cleansed and quietened by the gentle waters of Ch'ien Lung's Pool." It was one of the happiest days of her life; and "nothing," she says, "that has since happened, of sorrow, war, parting, can take that day away from us."

LIONEL GILES

* *The Pool of Ch'ien Lung.* By LADY HOSIE. (Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., London. 176 pp. 1948. 15s.)

Conditions of Happiness. By GORDON RATTRAY TAYLOR. (John Lane, The Bodley Head, Ltd., London. 280 pp. 1949. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

The quest of happiness is as old as mankind. Pleasure lies in the pursuit and not in the achievement, but pursuit means incessant labour, which an individual is unable to bear unless he gets occasional revivification by a partial realisation of his aims and aspirations. Leaving aside the mystic purpose of life, which some people regard as the plaything of the metaphysician, we have to consider the practical question as to how an individual should order his life so as to get the greatest happiness during the average span of life. We recommend this book to all thinking souls, happy or unhappy, as it contains a penetrating analysis of current ills. *Part I* of the book contains *Analysis*, *Part II* contains *Diagnosis* and *Part III* is devoted to *Synthesis*.

According to the author, every culture which aims at happiness must create basically sound personalities and assist the individual to meet his physical needs and to obtain security without sacrifice of variety. An individual cannot be happy without a function and a status, or without opportunities for mastery and exchange of affection, which is the mainspring of social cohesion as it is of individual psychic life. All factors governing happiness are, however, conditioned by customs and institutions and dominated by certain values. The author considers the Communist analysis of happiness as defective as it lacks in imagination to modify its philosophy in the light of the teachings of psychology and sociology. He rightly observes that popular support to a régime is never a proof that it is satisfactorily designed. He also condemns Fascism, which believes that to serve a cause is enough in itself but fails to appreciate that this service must be consonant with justice, liberty, variety, individuality, beauty and love.

In his thoughtful chapter on the "Sociology of Happiness" the author suggests a constructive alternative and reaches certain conclusions, which should be pondered over by all seekers of happiness. Man, to be happy, needs space and quiet as also a calm rhythm of life. The modern city cannot hope to satisfy these needs and consequently the author recommends a quasi-rural environment, which means a dispersal of population through the re-establishment of the village. The question of population density is examined in detail. If the population is too dense people begin to get in one another's way. In his remarks on mechanisation the author remarks that society cannot do without a machine but that we must modify machine production to suit the needs of society. The machine should be the servant of man and not his master.

The last chapter, "Politics of Happiness," is quite invigorating and deserves to be read by our politicians. The main thesis of the book is that men and society interact and that, without attacking the key points of this process we have no hope of success in the complete reconstruction of our ideas about politics, economics, morality, etc. Many political and economic theories of the present day are "90 per cent. error" as regards both ends and means. According to the new synthesis of our author, neither social action nor personal self-discipline, alone

or in combination, will suffice to bring us nearer a better world. True happiness lies not only in attaining one's own happiness but in assisting others to attain theirs, as in the reciprocal nature of love lies the promise of final harmony.

P. K. GODE

Human Rights in the Modern World. By ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE. (New York University Press, New York; Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, London. 162 pp. 1948. $3.75 and 21s.)

These six lectures were delivered at New York University in March and April 1946 under the James Stokes Lectureship on Politics. Professor Holcombe drives home to us the difficulties in the way of implementing the international bill of human rights so optimistically proposed by the framers of the United Nations Charter; and he is stimulating in the way he seeks to find an analogy between the microcosm of the United States and the macrocosm of the United Nations:—

> The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are, in fact, something more than the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states, and so it should be also under the Charter of the United Nations.

He reminds us that "it is not only the Americans, and Russians who do not see eye to eye. Consider, for instance, the Republic of Iceland and the Immamate of Yemen." And he does indeed consider them and make his readers consider them. He reminds us, too, that "the traditional differences between Islam and Christendom reach deeper than those between capitalists and communists"; that no two of the United Nations Big Five "attaches the same importance to a bill of rights at home"; and that even between New Yorkers and Virginians there is a wide gulf in their attitude to the Negro. He scrutinizes the results of a number of questionnaires of the Gallup Poll kind and is led to wonder how far "rights" mean anything to the American people at all. And he does not hesitate to point out that English and American bills of human rights tend to ignore the very two rights which should be axiomatic and basic in any society, the freedom from fear and the freedom from want.

Need one say that the shadow of the Soviet Union tends to darken every page? It is fair to add, however, that Russia seems less prone than the "capitalist" nations to offer her people "rights" of a woolly and insubstantial kind as compensation for perpetuating social and economic privilege among the few. Again, Professor Holcombe quotes Vyshinsky at the General Assembly in 1947 when he pointed out that the press campaigns of unscrupulous newspaper proprietors do not necessarily express public opinion. Who can deny it?

As ever, we clutch at any straw. Professor Holcombe devotes an epilogue to the proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information held at Geneva in the Spring of 1948. He measures its achievement impartially and regrets that "the search for common ground in matters of basic principle" was abandoned so soon:—

> The American admission that a free press cannot thrive without newsprint and the Soviet acceptance of a resolution stressing

moral responsibility rather than governmental controls as a partial solution of the problem of warmongering suggest the existence of common ground broad enough to support some necessary agreements concerning the relations of persons everywhere to the organised international community.

He ends with the pious hope that in our efforts to make a better world we shall not let "the best...become the enemy of the good." Politically, I suppose, this is wise. Politically, I suppose, men are forever having to fob off their instinctive quest of the absolute with mere compromise and ambiguity, which explains why politics are always anathema to artist, moralist, philosopher and mystic alike.

J. P. HOGAN

Not into Clean Hands. By LOUIS PAUWELS, translated by BERNARD MIALL. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 108 pp. 1948. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

This is a vividly written psychological novel in the modern manner; in parts violating modesty with its quite unnecessary "realism." But it is noteworthy because it illustrates the unfortunate tendency prevalent to mistake psychic experiences for spiritual ones, a tendency against which both writers and readers should be warned.

Evidently the author believes that he depicts in his hero, Jousselin, a degree of spiritual detachment with consequent happiness. After the shock of a domestic crisis brought about by his own lapse from morality, Jousselin—a careless but not a bad man—having destroyed his loving wife's trust and happiness, oblivious of her and his children's needs sneaks away from home permeated by an unreasonable feeling of complacency and irresponsibility and entirely centred in his nebulous sense of detachment from them. Vaguely distressed and bewildered, he returns home after some time. He watches his little son die in agony; soon his tormented and desperate wife commits sucide; his young daughter is thrown on the world—he does nothing for any of them—it concerns him not. He muses: "How beautiful all things are!" After all this the author leaves him walking and singing along the bank of the river, still vaguely musing: "There must be a man in the world who can tell me what one must do when one has the happiness that I have." But there is no indication that the author wishes to convey that his hero has become insane—and this is the crux.

To think that Jousselin depicts any degree of spirituality is a grave error. Between spiritual states and such undesirable psychic states as are here described there is a profound difference. To think that spiritual bliss falls into unclean hands is another great delusion. Jousselin pictures the tragic state of one who abrogates his manhood and falls prey to psychic influences; a poor deluded man.

E. P. T.

Emanuel Swedenborg: Scientist and Mystic. By SIGNE TOKSVIG. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 389 pp. 1949. 30s.); *The Wisdom of John Woolman.* By REGINALD REYNOLDS. (Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 178 pp. 1949. 10s. 6*d.*)

Miss Toksvig has performed an exacting task with formidable thoroughness: she even describes Swedenborg's garden, catalogues what he grew in it, and supplies details of its size and where he bought his bulbs and seeds.

Swedenborg was no straightforward mystic with an elementary background, like Boehme's, for example, of a cobbler's bench in a tranquil Silesian town. Swedenborg was a public figure, a mathematician, a mining expert and technical adviser to the Swedish Government, a physicist, a biologist and a philosopher; he had visions, and some thought him mad, others, a saint; he was worldly yet aloof; orthodox yet heretical.

Miss Toksvig keeps cool throughout. She quotes Svante Arrhenius's summary of the ideas first expressed by Swedenborg and subsequently taken up by Buffon, Kant, Laplace, G. H. Darwin and others. She cites the range of poets—Blake, Goethe, Heine, and many others—who in one way or another have been influenced by him; she reveals " the startling likeness " between some of his ideas and those of Boehme, Schwenkfeld and other Protestant mystics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and she shows how his " doctrine of series and degrees " anticipated the theories of modern biologists.

Unlike most mystics Swedenborg did not denigrate or ignore the existence of the senses. " Physical passion, " says Miss Toksvig, " had galled him, but he did not think of physical pleasure as immoral in itself. " In fact, far from being afraid of the flesh, he tended to recognise it as the gateway to the spirit, or even as a manifestation of the spirit. For him the real enemy was not sexual love but self-love; and it is for the particularity of his development of this common and fundamental wisdom that he is likely to be revered today by those of us who are not scientists and lack the hardihood to call ourselves mystics.

The thermometer drops as we turn to Woolman, the gentle New Jersey Quaker who tried to practise in the minutest particulars of his daily living his horror of wealth, violence and injustice, and who even wore undyed clothes because dyes were made by slaves. Mr. Reynolds, a comparatively young member of the Society of Friends, seems profoundly concerned to rid it of its accumulated impedimenta of wealth and prestige and to bring it back to the religious simplicity of its first noble principles. In the figure of John Woolman—a lonely figure even in Woolman's own day—he sees the pure Quaker *par excellence;* and in his admirable selection from Woolman's essays and journals we are able to find for ourselves a wisdom, a serenity and a oneness of principle and practice—a manifestation of conscience almost visible and palpable—which is as relevant today as it was when Woolman wrote. But (after the Swedenborg book) the omission of the rose and the knot of fire—the tenderness and ardour of the senses—seems as vast, bewildering and tantalizing as the gap left when a tooth has been extracted.

J. P. HOGAN

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SANSKRIT

[**Principal N. A. Gore, M. A.,** of the Kanara College, Kumta, continues here his running commentary on current developments in Sanskrit literature and culture, the last previous instalment of which appeared in our May issue.—Ed.]

The Central Government of the Indian Union earned the gratitude of Sanskritists by appointing Dr. C. Kunhan Raja on the Scientific and Cultural Mission it sent to Nepal last May. The libraries of the Durbar and the Rājaguru together possess one of the largest and most important collections of Sanskrit mss. in India. The oldest ms. of the *Ādiparva of the Mahābhārata* was found in Nepal and, due to favourable climatic conditions, many other very old mss. are treasured in these collections. The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute of Poona had sent a mission there for microfilming rare manuscripts of other Books of the *Mahābhārata*. Dr. Kunhan Raja has had great experience in reorganising and cataloguing manuscript collections and it would be a great achievement if he should succeed in inducing the Nepal Government to take up the long overdue work of preparing Descriptive Catalogues of the two big mss. collections there.

The *Kalyāṇa* gives some details about the Syllabus in Sanskrit in the Kabul University. At present there are about 25 students of Sanskrit there, studying under an Indian Pandit, Dr. Paramanand. They have to study Devanāgrī script, elementary grammar and selections from Sanskrit prose and poetry and a few chapters of the *Bhagavadgītā*, in the first year. The second-year students have to make a comparative study of the *Koran* and the *Gītā*. In the third year, in addition to an advanced study of the *Gītā*, they have to learn the history of Sanskrit literature. In the final year dramas like *Śākuntala* and texts on the Darśanas or systems of Indian philosophy are prescribed.

The All-India Sanskrit Sāhitya Sammelan in its annual conference at Benares, and the Calcutta session of the Sanskrit Rāṣṭrīya Pracāra Samiti both passed resolutions urging the adoption of Sanskrit as the national language of India. The office of the *Sanskrita* of Ayodhya has started an organisation to carry on propaganda in this behalf.

The saner and more acceptable view on this point was expressed by Dr. S. K. Belvalkar in his Convocation Address before the Vedaśāstrottejaka Sabhā of Poona. He is for adopting Hindi as the national language for inter-provincial intercourse of common men and Basic Sanskrit for learned literary transactions. His address contains also much information about the state of Sanskrit studies in the early period of the British rule. He attributes the deterioration of Sanskrit learning to the fact that Sanskrit has since 1839 been taught only as a second language and outlines a plan for its improvement. He recommends that the Poona University institute a Faculty of Oriental Learning for raising the tone of Sanskrit scholarship and suggests that orthodox Pandits and scholars from the Universities should actively co-operate on equal terms.

A memorable and pleasant function presided over by Dr. P. V. Kane, the Vice-Chancellor of the Bombay University, was arranged on 18th May at the Bhandarkar Institute, Poona, to honour Shri P. K. Gode for his distinguished services for 30 years. In his official capacity he has displayed high efficiency and been ever ready to help research scholars. But, as the numerous messages of good-will received on the occasion from renowned scholars all over the world showed, he is held in high esteem by them chiefly for his own research which is truly remarkable for its volume, originality, methodical presentation of facts and accuracy of conclusions. His published papers now exceed 400 and they have brought him honours unsought from far and near. Only recently the Suprema Reggenza d'Italia, Bologna, elected him Knight of the Sovereign and Military Order of the Temple of Jerusalem. The fact that over 125 papers were contributed in less than six months to the proposed *Gode Commemoration Volume* by scholars from Latin America, the U.S.A., Germany, France, England and all parts of India is proof of the affectionate regard in which he is held by Sanskritists all over the world.

Ācārya Jinavijayaji Muni, Honorary Director of the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, has, like Shri Gode, rendered a twofold service to Indology. A great scholar of Jainology and Prakrit literature, he has edited many rare and important works besides writing highly informative forewords to editions of other scholars. Owing to the great influence he wields over the custodians of big mss. collections in Gujarat and Rajputana on the one hand and over the rich merchant princes on the other, he has brought to light many rare and unique mss. and encouraged scholars to edit them by arranging to publish the editions through the Singhi Jain Series, the Bharatiya Vidya Series and the Jain Saṁśodhaka Pratiṣṭhāna. He has just completed 61 years of his fruitful life and it is high time that his services to Sanskrit Studies were commemorated by Oriental scholars and Institutions by offering him a *Jinavijayaji Presentation Volume* at no distant date.

The bulk of the first number of the fifth volume of the *Prācyavāṇī* is devoted to the annual reports for 1946 and 1947 of the Prācyāvaṇī Institute of Oriental Learning of Calcutta. Founded in 1943 by Dr. J. B. Chaudhuri and his scholarly wife, Dr. Roma Chaudhuri, the Institute has been doing good research and cultural work. To implement the fundamental objects of the Institute, which are "to create and foster a permanent feeling of friendship and fraternity among the different communities and nations of the world," many public lectures and discussion meetings are arranged and the topic of Hindu-Muslim unity receives due attention. Dr. J. B. Chaudhuri has been publishing Sanskrit works of Muslim authors or those of Hindu authors on Muslim history in India. The present number, for instance, contains the preliminary portion of the *Samudrasaṅgama*, a philosophical work in Sanskrit by Mahammad Dara Sukoh, the unfortunate brother of Aurangzeb, and the introduction and summary of the *Abdullacarita* of Lakṣmīpati (18th century). This work is a historical poem in 1800 verses throwing much light on the rule of the later Moghals in India. He has also

published in book form a Sanskrit work on Indian music by a Muslim author, *viz.*, the *Saṅgītamālikā* of Mahammad Shah. The other activities of the Institute consist of staging Sanskrit plays, guidance of research work of the University students, regular classes for the teaching of the *Upaniṣads*, the *Gītā*, the *Smṛties*, Indian philosophy and Sanskrit literature, and awarding prizes for essays on set subjects. The Institute has branches at Delhi, Simla, Benares and Cuttack.

We are happy to report three fine works on the life and work of Mahatma Gandhi. The *Gāndhī-Gītā*[1] in twenty chapters is an original metrical composition of Shri S. N. Tadpatrikar of Poona. Written in close imitation of the *Gītā* in form and style, it chronicles the Civil Disobedience Movement, beginning with the famous Dandi March and ending with India's attainment of Freedom. The author possesses skill in turning out effective narrative verses and we endorse whole-heartedly the hope expressed by Shri G. V. Mavalankar in his Foreword that this *Gāndhī-Gītā* will form the nucleus for a full-fledged new Epic, the *Svātantrya-Saṁhitā*, embodying the full details of the national struggle for freedom. The author has expressed to us his readiness to undertake this literary adventure, provided the necessary financial help and due encouragement are forthcoming.

The *Mahātmavijayah*[2] of Shri K. L. Vyāsarāya Sastri is a short poem in 108 verses in diverse metres and of great poetic merit. His poetry is reminiscent of Kālidāsa in beauty of imagery and felicity of diction. This poem is remarkable also in giving a fine exposition of Gandhiji's teachings rather than a bald recital of incidents in his life or political events.

The *Madhuravāṇī*, a Sanskrit magazine of Belgaum, brought out a few months back a Special Gandhi Number which for the most part gives in a simple and chaste prose style a fairly comprehensive Sanskrit biography of Gandhiji.

If Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's earnest desire to promote the study of Sanskrit is to be given concrete shape, the educationists in this country must see that the study of Sanskrit becomes popular in appeal and sound in principle. They would do well to pay careful attention to the recommendations as to the correct method of teaching Sanskrit made by Prof. G. S. Huparikar in his book, *The Problem of Sanskrit Teaching*.[3] The author has studied both in the orthodox way of the *Pāṭhaśālās* and the critical and historical method of the University and has taught Sanskrit teaching methods for a number of years. He is thus best qualified to take a comparative view of Eastern and Western pedagogy and to apply it to the teaching of Sanskrit. His book consists of two volumes on the same subject: the first, of less than 100 pages, is in Sanskrit for the benefit of Śāstris who cannot understand English and the second, of 600 pages, is in English and deals exhaustively with

[1] *Gandhi-Gita*. By S. N. TADPATRIKAR, M.A. with Forewords in Sanskrit by H. E. Shri M. S. ANEY, Governor of Bihar, and in English by the Hon. Shri G. V. MAVALANKAR, Speaker, Indian Dominon Parliament. (Oriental Book Agency, Poona 2. 1949. Rs. 3/12)

[2] *Mahatmavijayah*. By VIDYASAGARA K. L. V. SASTRI. (R. S. Vadhyar and Sons, Kalpathi-Palghat, 1949)

[3] *The Problem of Sanskrit Teaching*. By G. S. HUPARIKAR, M.A., B.T. (Bharat Bookstall, Kolhapur. 1949. Rs. 12/8.)

the subject. The author's thesis is that the ancient method of *Khaṇḍanvaya*, which is mainly a method of questions and answers and bears a close resemblance to the Direct Method should find general acceptance in schools and colleges. The book also contains hints on the correct way of reading and reciting Sanskrit, a criticism of the present syllabuses in Sanskrit in schools and colleges and detailed suggestions for their improvement. Despite a rather cumbrous style, the book is an outstanding and thought-provoking contribution on the subject.

The *Saṁkalpasūryodaya*[4] is an allegorical drama in ten Acts, written by Veṅkaṭanātha, popularly known as Shri Vedāntadeśika, who has to his credit 60 other works in Sanskrit and 45 in Tamil. Its prototype, the *Prabodhacandrodaya* of Kṛṣṇamiśra (11th century) was written for propagating and popularising the teachings of the Advaita Vedānta philosophy, through the medium of a drama. The present play links up Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta to devotion of the Lord and divine Grace and depicts the attainment by a devotee of the bliss of liberation (*mukti*) on the rising (*udaya*) of the Sun (*Sūrya*) of Divine resolve (*saṁkalpa*). The *dramatis personæ* are the forces of Good such as *Viveka* (Wisdom) contending against and conquering the forces of Evil represented by *Mahāmoha* (the Great Delusion) and others. The present edition is published with two excellent commentaries of *Ahobalācārya* and Nṛsiṁharāja, which clearly bring out the philosophical import of the drama and are published here for the first time. The Sanskrit Introduction by the editor, Pandit V. Krishnamacharya besides giving a lucid summary of this lengthy drama, deals with the life, works and teaching of the great Vaiṣṇavaite scholar Shri Vedāntadeśika. The English Foreword by Shri V. V. Srinivasan clearly brings out the literary and philosophical importance of the drama.

In the *Kaṭhopaniṣad-bhāṣya*[5] of Shri Raṅgarāmānuja we have another work belonging to the school of Śri Rāmānujācārya. Though English translations of *Advaita*-commentaries on the *Upaniṣads* had been available, no English translations of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* commentaries had so far been available. This deficiency is made good by the Śri Veṅkateśvara Oriental Institute of Tirupati. It has already published the *Īśa* and the *Kena Upaniṣads* with the texts and English translations of Raṅgarāmānuja's *bhāṣya*, which expounds the *Upaniṣads* from the Viśiṣṭādvaitā point of view. The *Kaṭhopaniṣad* belongs to the *Kāṭhaka* school of the *Kṛṣṇa-Yajurveda* and is the third of the 13 principal *Upaniṣads*. It is very popular with the students of Indian philosophy by reason of its high poetical and charming style and the well-known story of the boy Niciketas who dared to meet the god of Death face to face, brushed aside temptations of earthly pleasures and demanded to know the nature of the Soul after death. The brief explanatory notes in Sanskrit added by the learned editors enhance the value

[4] *Samkalpasuryodaya*. By VENKATANATHA; edited by PANDIT V. KRISHNACHARYA. (Adyar Library Series No. 65, Vols. I and II. Adyar. 1948. Rs. 15/-)

[5] *Kathopanisad-bhasya* of SRI RANGARAMANUJACARYA; edited with Introduction, English translation, and notes by Dr. K. C. VARADACHARI and Pandit D. T. TATACHARYA. (Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati. 1948. Rs. 2/-)

of this edition.

The Sri Ramakrishna Math, Madras, has published well-printed and moderately priced editions of the principal *Upaniṣads* with translations and explanations in English. As the meanings of individual words are separately explained these are very useful for beginners in Upaniṣadic study. The Math's latest publication is *Śrimad Bhagavad-Gītā*[6] with the English translation of the *Subodhinī* commentary of Śrīdhara Svāmi, who, even when following the Advaitic interpretation of Śaṅkara, emphasises in simple Sanskrit the devotional element in the *Gītā*. The fact that this is the first translation in English of this interesting commentary is enough justification for this new edition of the *Gītā*, of which there are many editions already. The *Yoga Sutras* of Patañjali,[7] though in themselves exceedingly brief, contain a perfect and co-ordinated system of spiritual discipline. Patañjali's

purpose is, to set in order the practical means for the unveiling and regeneration [of the immortal man] and to indicate the fruit, the glory and the power, of that new birth.

This interpretation of the *Yoga Sūtras* is admirably suited for all aspirants after Spiritual perfection. In very simple and non-technical language the author clearly brings out the implications of the *Sūtras*. The exposition of the *Sūtras* in each of the four books is preceded by a short introduction which critically evaluates the teaching of that book which follows. Mr. Johnston's remarks (pp. 87 ff.) on the attainment and use of the spiritual powers are indicative of profound study of mysticism. A study of this book will give the lie direct to the regrettable and hasty charge or Dr. A. B. Keith in his *Classical Sanskrit Literature* that the *Yoga Sūtras* are a "confused text," for Mr. Johnston finds the *Sūtras* of Patañjali "as closely knit together, as dependent on each other, as the propositions of Euclid."

The Jain scholars have made valuable contributions to all deparments of Sanskrit literature. The three books noticed below, for instance, constitute important additions to Sanskrit poetry, logic and natural astrology. All are published in the well-known Singhi Jain Series founded by the late Bahadursimhji Singhi of Calcutta at the instance of Muni Jinavijayaji Acārya.

The *Dharmābhyudaya*,[8] a poem of exceptional merīt in 15 Cantos is written by Udayaprabhasūri. It has been edited from four mss. by Munis Catūravijayaji and Puṇyavijayaji. The first and last Cantos, dealing with the great Minister Vastupāla of Gujarat, are of historical import. The Introduction by Muni Jinavijayaji and the essay of Shri K. B. Dave are full of information about the literary sources for the life and work of Vastupāla. It is good to note that they are to be issued as a separate volume in the same series. The author shows great command over the Sanskrit language and the poem, full of alliteration and other figures of speech, deserves to be widely read.

[6] *Srimad Bhagavad-Gita*, with the commentary of SRIDHARA SVAMI, translated by SWAMI VISWESWARANANDA. (Sri Ramakrishna Math, Mylapore, Madras. Rs. 7/-)

[7] *The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali*. By CHARLES JOHNSTON. (John M. Watkins, London. 1949. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

[8] *Dharmabhyudaya Mahakavya*. By UDAYAPRABHASURI. (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. 1949. Rs. 12/8)

The *Nyāyāvātāravārtika-vṛtti*[9] of Śānti Sūri is a commentary on the *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara (5th century), which is a fundamental Jain work on logic in only 32 stanzas, dealing with the means of proof (*pramāṇa*) and the method of comprehending things (*naya*) from particular standpoints. This basic work is critically edited here with the commentary, without which it would be indeed incomprehensible. The introduction of 152 pages and the explanatory notes, running into another 162 pages, testify to Pandit Malvaniya's deep study of Jain, Hindu and Buddhistic logic and philosophy. The introduction should prove valuable for a correct understanding of the *Anekāntāvāda* and the *Syādvāda*.

The *Bhadrabāhusaṁhitā*[10] edited by Dr. A. S. Gopani deals with the portents of rain and weather, epidemics, earthquakes, lightning strokes, outbreak of fire and storms. It also contains information on good and bad omens at the time of marching of armies, the effects on man of the combinations of planets with certain constellations and the interpretation of dreams. In some respects books like the *Bṛhatsaṁhitā* of Varāhamihira and the *Bhadrabāhusaṁhitā* were to the ancient man what the forecasts of observatories are to the modern man. Even after constitution from 4 mss. the text of the book under review is badly corrupted which is particularly unfortunate in such a work of scientific nature. In the opinion of the General Editor, the work so far discovered is only a fragment of 26 chapters of the original which must have contained some 45 to 50 chapters. While he is prepared to assign it to the 11th or 12th century, the editor considers it to be a work of some unknown author of much later date who ascribed it to Bhadrabāhu.

The *Vāstuvidyā*[11], *i.e.*, architectural canons of India, has not received serious attention of many scholars. It is good to find that Dr. Tarapada Bhattacharya has joined the small band of scholars like Dr. P. K. Acharya, Shri O. C. Gangoly and Dr. Stella Kramrisch who have made monumental contributions to our knowledge of the subject. This book of Dr. Bhattacharya's is very useful for getting a connected history of the Indian architecture from the Vedic period to the twelfth century A.D. He gives interesting information on the origin and classification of Indian temples, the schools of *Vāstuśāstra*, the use of bricks and stones in Indian architecture and the underlying principles of *Vāstuvidyā*. Against the opinion of Dr. Acharya, he asserts that the *Mānasāra* now extant cannot be assigned to a period earlier than the 11th century. There is much technical information on the various dimensions of doors and bricks used in Indian architecture. This book reflects much patient study and is an outstanding contribution to the historical and comparative study of Indian architecture.

N. A. Gore

[9] *Nyayavataravartika-vrtti*. (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. 1949. Rs. 16/8)

[10] *Bhadrabahusamhita*. Edited by Dr. A. S. Gopani. (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. 1949. Rs. 5/12)

[11] *A Study on Vastuvidya*. By Tarapada Bhattacharya. (Published by author, P. O. Bankipore, Patna. 1948. Rs. 14/-)

CORRESPONDENCE

SOCIAL LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC OPINION

Sir Henry Maine asserts: "Society is always in advance of law." We are passing through a period of social upheaval in which we are rapidly and indiscriminately importing certain Western social norms. Many new enactments which are bound to have far-reaching repercussions on the morale of different sections of society, and ultimately on the strength of the nation, have already appeared on the statute books, while others are in the offing. The indiscreet haste with which bills are being introduced in the Dominion and Provincial Legislatures is an index of legislative enthusiasm but also of a general tendency among social thinkers towards superficiality.

The life and activities of citizens are being controlled, regulated, circumscribed and at times even smothered by the mushroom growth of enactments in every department. It is becoming impossible for even the law-abiding public to keep pace with the new legislation. Thousands may be unconsciously doing violence to the law.

With the growing complexity in modern industrial life, some new legislation is inevitable; but excessive legislation curtails individual freedom at every stage and puts an unhealthy obstacle to the spontaneous development of individuals, social groups, social relations and institutions. The free natural life of the community tends to give place to artificiality and an unnatural environment in which people lead their anxious lives.

It would be improper to suppose that the bulk of the new social legislation which is being introduced is eagerly sought by the teeming millions of India.

Society must be governed by the minimum number of laws of maximum simplicity. The questions which the Dominion or Provincial Legislature must put before itself, therefore, in each case, are whether the proposed enactment is essential, whether the advantages arising out of it will outnumber the disadvantages and whether it is wholesome for the structure of society in the long run. Individuals are prepared for a certain number of laws or a certain degree of social regulation as the optimum level of social control. If social and individual restrictions increase beyond this level, we do not find a corresponding increase in social restraint and happiness; but, rather, more social turbulence and discontent.

No police force would be adequate to enforce law and order in a society seething with discontent, full of class hatred and lacking moral values. The ultimate sanction of law is the physical force of the State, and it is the work of the judiciary to see that obedience to law is rigidly enforced. It is, however, undesirable for the State always to have to enforce such obedience. It must rather inculcate moral values which will prevent people from violating the laws. The necessity of a firm grip on moral values was never so badly felt as now.

Even under a democratic Government public opinion is never the considered opinion of every member of the public, obviously because not all are capable of original thinking and of forming their own opinions on the strength of independent reasoning. Man acts as he feels and not as he thinks. Although the Legislature is composed of the elected representatives of all the people, the leanings of public opinion are always controlled by a few who play upon public sentiments and are largely responsible for moulding public opinion as they desire. The public never demands excessive legislation; it abhors it. It is always the so-called leaders of public opinion who load new and ever new legislation on the public.

It is a commonplace argument with social reformers and self-constituted leaders that we must change with the ever-changing environment. Adaptability to the new environment is good, but the relinquishment of the basic principles of the social structure and the adoption of new ones have their dangers.

That man is but a feeble creature of environment is only a half-truth. It will spell disaster if we succumb to an unwholesome environment under the name of adaptability and reform, instead of bettering the environment and reforming public opinion by the inculcation of moral values. Environment is bound to be unstable; and it does not necessarily follow that it changes for the better. The proper way in these circumstances is to bring about a radical change in the environment itself, to bring it in harmony with the social ideal of biological permanence and the social weal, instead of changing basic social laws and doing violence to the fundamental principles underlying the social structure.

Manipulating the structure of society on the ground of the exigencies of the moment or of political expediency or of individual likes and dislikes or of common-sense or of mere convenience, is a dangerous game which, in the larger interest of the nation and of the future generations, short-sighted politicians should not play. Patterns of individual and social behaviour must be regulated in the light of the findings of the social sciences, not by the vagaries of the politicians.

As Aldous Huxley has written in *Ends and Means*—

> We must not forget that reforms may deliver men from one set of evils, only to lead them into evils of another kind....An old outlet for some particular wickedness is closed; but a new outlet is opened. The wickedness is not abolished; it is merely provided with a different set of opportunities for self-expression.

V. R. TALASIKAR

Newasa,
Ahmednagar District.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

" _____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

The Governor-General of India, Shri C. Rajagopalachari, in an address declaring open the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan's new building at Bombay on August 8th, pleaded for not disturbing, in zeal for elementary education, the threads of essential labour on which the Nation's life hung. These had been kept unbroken by family tradition, by children assisting in their parents' work and learning the family trade. He proposed restricting formal schooling to three days a week, allowing the children four days for family apprenticeship to their parents' trade.

Basically important as this proposal is, his strictures on the Indian Universities' failure to produce the thousands of men of character required as leaders and administrators are no less so. He rejected the excuse that they reflected the intellectual and moral confusion outside. Their function was "to do something to restore moral values and intellectual orderliness."

If our Vedantic culture had been kept alive, not in scholarship alone but in the hearts of men and in their deeper understanding, no deficiency in school or college would have mattered or resulted in serious harm.

Its discipline and restraint and sense of moral values would have prevented the present large-scale demonstration of selfishness and greed. He believed that its spirit could be recaptured indirectly, while avoiding denominational religious training, by a broad scheme of study of various religions and philosophies. Students encouraged to interest themselves in the literature of Christianity, Judaism and Islam and in the Classics of Greece and Rome would recapture for themselves the Vedanta.

Not by total exclusion of all religion and spiritual thought, but by all-embracing acquaintance and appreciation of spiritual thought of all kinds shall we be safe and shape ourselves properly.

An admirable prescription for moral training in secular schools throughout the world, and a long step towards Brotherhood *in actu!*

Sir Samuel Ranganadhan, former High Commissioner for India in England, who presided at the World Peace Day celebration of the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on August 6th, declared that peace was unattainable without social justice, without national righteousness. World peace was threatened by exploitation and by fanaticism, religious and political. Something more than the freedom of all peoples was necessary to world peace, namely, moral regeneration and a new spirit of understanding and co-operation between nations. The only solid basis for enduring peace was "moral and spiritual recovery among men—exemplifying in our own lives the spirit of justice, the spirit of good-will, the spirit of mutual co-operation."

This responsibility of the individual for world peace was the key-note of Shrimati Sophia Wadia's address. She stressed brotherhood and universal solidarity, which meant that an injury

to one injured all and that individual self-transformation had its direct effect on all. Even science was beginning to recognise co-operation as the basic law of life. There would be lasting peace if each followed the Way of Peace by cultivating love, sympathy and understanding, and compassion, which included them all.

Shri Masti Venkatesa Iyengar believed that art, which appealed to all, might bring about union where philosophy and religion had failed. He deplored the pitting of governments against each other in the name of rival ideologies, and he condemned war as the supreme evil, "an animal's way of settling the question of rights." He called for haters of hatred itself.

The following Resolution was unanimously passed :—

Those present at this meeting, held at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on August 6th, 1949, to observe World Peace Day, affirm their faith in recognition of the brotherhood of all humanity and in the paramountcy of the Moral Law, with their corollary that there can be no lasting peace except on a basis of justice and mutual good-will. They are convinced that efforts to spread the intellectual recognition of that true fraternity of mankind, above all worldly distinctions, as a step to the realization of that fraternity and action in terms thereof, are of the first importance for the establishment of a united world in which no nation shall put its own supposed interests ahead of the interests of the whole, but each shall work for all and all for each. They are assured that if the foundations of mutual sympathy and appreciation and the will to righteousness are there, the organisational and other problems of the One World in the making will be well and truly solved.

What Shrimati Vijayalakshmi Pandit told a Columbia University audience at New York early in August, whe she spoke on "India to America," the need for the happy combination the two countries recalls the messag of our September 1941 editorial, "Indi and the Americas in the Future, which was that "history points to New Civilisation arising out of th proper blending of American and India cultures."

She ascribed the world's presen troubles to selfishness and to attaching value to things really valueless, and she brought the lesson home by pointing out America's great need of the wisdom of the ages. She said that America, when she first arose, "had people with a spiritual force equal to the greatest in any other country. But today that spiritual force was getting somewhat dim." The inspiring message of Jefferson and of Lincoln, by which the American people had come by their success "today appeared to be in danger."

Your atom bombs and your skyscrapers will stand you in little stead unless that message is taken to heart and put into practice.

But with what grace can present-day India point out the shortcomings of other countries? Cannot "India" be substituted for "America" in her remarks, and "Gandhiji" for "Jefferson and Lincoln"? India's responsibility and her opportunity are great. She must dispense her spiritual wealth to starving peoples, but she must do so with clean hands lest her proffered gifts be spurned. However just the admonition offered, it will be valueless if it provokes deservedly the taunt, "Physician, heal thyself!"